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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE POWER: 
EXPLORING NASCENT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN NATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. SEBELIUS 
RONALD KAHN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Does National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius1 sug-
gest any means through which the Supreme Court, in the future, might limit 
executive and legislative authority over social and economic policy in gen-
eral and health care policy in particular?2 
Does the fact that five Justices support the notion that the Commerce 
Clause only applies to action as opposed to inaction—that is, only applies 
after an individual has entered the economic system3—mean that this dis-
tinction (between action and inaction) will allow the United States Supreme 
Court to limit congressional and presidential action in support of social and 
economic policy aimed at meeting the ever-increasing complexity of our 
nation? 
While the Internet colloquy addressing Sebelius on the day the Su-
preme Court announced its decision centered on the political implications 
of the case, with particular regard to why Chief Justice Roberts viewed 
Congress’s taxing power as a basis on which the constitutionality of the Af-
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 1.  132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  In this article, this case will be referred to as Sebelius. 
 2.  The Affordable Care Act mandates that most Americans (not prisoners or undocumented 
aliens) maintain “minimal essential” health insurance coverage or pay a “shared responsibility 
payment.”  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2006).  If an individual taxpayer fails to maintain such 
health care coverage, the IRS will impose a penalty on the taxpayer.  Id. § 5000A(b)–(c).  Does 
Congress, however, have the constitutional authority to enact the individual mandate?  If so, does 
Congress’s authority stem from its Commerce Clause power to regulate commerce among the 
states?  Five Justices answer this question in the negative (Justices Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, 
Thomas, Scalia); the remaining four Justices answer this question in the affirmative (Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor).  See generally Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
 3.  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (noting that Congress’s power to regulate commerce 
“presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated” and that “[i]f the power to 
‘regulate’ something included the power to create it, many of the provisions in the Constitution 
would be superfluous” (emphasis added)). 
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fordable Care Act4 (“ACA”) could rest,5 this Article will explore the legal 
implications of five Justices’ support in Sebelius of the inaction-action dis-
tinction as a basis for constitutional violations under the Commerce 
Clause.6 
Is the Supreme Court in Sebelius creating a path to an individual right 
or liberty interest that could trump the power of the President and Congress 
to make economic and social policy? 
Is the inaction-action distinction in Sebelius a “loaded weapon” for fu-
ture courts to use to define a new libertarian individual right, and thus, 
should this distinction be viewed as another by-product of what Tom Keck 
has called the conservative “rights revolution” in our nation?7 
Commerce Clause cases are usually not viewed as cases directly in-
volving individual rights, but are primarily interpreted as cases involving 
polity principles, such as state compared to national government power un-
der concepts of federalism, or congressional versus presidential power un-
der the separation of powers doctrine.8  Nevertheless, debates over polity 
                                                          
 4.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 5.  See generally Kali Borkoski, Live Blog of the Health Care Decision (Sponsored by 
Bloomberg Law), SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 9:29 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/live-blog-of-the-health-care-decision-sponsored-by-
bloomberg-law/ (presenting the entirety of the live blog on the day the Supreme Court announced 
its decision in Sebelius). 
 6.  As a preliminary matter, I agree with the view that Chief Justice Roberts did not want to 
overturn the ACA because of long standing polity principles, including the view that the Supreme 
Court should not overturn congressional legislation if a constitutionally viable reason can be found 
in support of such legislation.  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (stating that the “question is not 
whether [the Government’s construction of the Act as imposing a tax] is the most natural interpre-
tation of the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one” because “‘every reasonable 
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality’” (internal cita-
tions omitted)).  Secondarily, I believe Chief Justice Roberts feared that, politically, overturning 
the ACA would raise the specter of his Court being viewed as a new “Lochner Court.”  See, e.g., 
James Raskin, The Ghost of Lochner Sits on the Supreme Court and Haunts the Land, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamie-raskin/the-ghost-of-
lochner-sits_b_1398073.html (“The ghost of Lochner is alive and well on the Roberts Court, 
which has been busily dismantling laws that stand in the way of total corporate freedom.”).  Nev-
ertheless, these institutional concerns do not preclude the fact that also at issue in Sebelius are nas-
cent rights principles that conservative justices now, and perhaps liberal justices in the future, 
might support as they analyze such principles in light of the changing world outside the Court. 
 7.  See THOMAS KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 282 (2004).  
 8.  But cf. Arthur J.R. Baker, Fundamental Mismatch: The Improper Integration of Individu-
al Liberty Rights into Commerce Clause Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 259, 298–99 (2011) (noting that “there is a history of liberty-based at-
tacks on congressional exercises of power under the Commerce Clause focusing on the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which prohibits slavery” and further suggesting that “legal challenges to the individ-
ual mandate as coercing individuals into activity amount to a veiled form of the earlier Thirteenth 
Amendment arguments”). 
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principles informing the powers of government institutions raise important 
questions about individual rights.  For example, in Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha,9 Justice Powell, in concurrence, emphasized 
that the use of the legislative veto by the House to overturn a decision by 
the Immigration and Nationalization Service to allow Mr. Chadha to remain 
in the country is a denial of individual rights.10  When the legislative veto 
permitted Congress to deport Mr. Chadha, without applying general rules to 
his individual case or ensuring that the procedural safeguards found in 
courts and in quasi-judicial bodies in administrative agencies were used, in-
dividual rights were compromised.11 
My work to date has centered on the process through which individual 
rights have developed under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Explored to date is the question of why a 
conservative/moderate Supreme Court in the conservative political age 
since the 1990s has expanded implied fundamental rights to sexual intimacy 
for homosexuals and sustained the fundamental right of women to choose 
whether to have an abortion.12  One would expect the Supreme Court in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to be conservative.  Since 
1969, when President Nixon named Warren Burger as Chief Justice, 
through 2005, when President George W. Bush appointed Chief Justice 
John Roberts to and nominated Samuel Alito for the Supreme Court, Re-
publican presidents had made twelve of fourteen appointments to the Su-
preme Court, thus constituting a clear majority of appointees in any given 
year.13 
                                                          
 9.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 10.  See id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring) (“When [Congress] decides rights of specific per-
sons, those rights are subject to ‘the tyranny of a shifting majority.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 11.  See id. (“In deciding whether Chadha deserves to be deported, Congress is not subject to 
any internal constraints that prevent it from arbitrarily depriving him of the right to remain in this 
country. . . . Congress is not bound by established substantive rules.  Nor is it subject to the proce-
dural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are 
present when a court or an agency adjudicates individual rights.”). 
 12.  See Ronald Kahn, Social Constructions, Supreme Court Reversals, and American Politi-
cal Development: Lochner, Plessy, Bowers, but Not Roe, in THE SUPREME COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 67 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006); see also 
Ronald Kahn, Why Does a Moderate/Conservative Supreme Court in a Conservative Age Expand 
Gay Rights?: Lawrence v. Texas (2003) in Legal and Political Time, in 44 STUDIES IN LAW, 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY, SPECIAL ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN A CONSERVATIVE ERA 
(Austin Sarat ed., 2008). 
 13.  President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger (1969), Justice Blackmun (1970), Justice 
Powell (1972), and Justice Rehnquist (1972).  President Ford appointed Justice Stevens (1975). 
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited July 28, 2013).  Democratic 
President Carter had no appointees to the Supreme Court.  President Reagan appointed Justice  
O’Connor (1981), reappointed Justice Rehnquist as Chief Justice in 1986, and appointed Justices 
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The Supreme Court, however, has not overturned any of the major in-
dividual rights cases from the progressive Warren Court era (1954–1969).  
Moreover, during the years under Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969–
1986), the Supreme Court expanded individual rights in significant ways, 
deciding that a woman had a constitutional right to elect abortion in Roe v. 
Wade,14 that gender classifications under the law would be subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny in Craig v. Boren,15 and that race can be one 
factor among many in the admission of students to colleges and universities 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978).16 
During the Rehnquist Court, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right to 
abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.17  
                                                          
Scalia (1986) and Kennedy (1988).  President George Herbert Walker Bush appointed Justices 
Souter (1990) and Thomas (1991).  Democratic President Bill Clinton appointed Justices Ginsburg 
(1993) and Breyer (1994).  Not until 2005, eleven years later, would any President make addition-
al appointments to the Supreme Court.  In 2005, Republican President George W. Bush appointed 
John Roberts as Chief Justice.  One year later, Bush appointed Justice Alito.  For a list of all Su-
preme Court nominations from 1789 to the present, including those listed above, see U. S. Senate, 
Supreme Court Nominations 1789—Present, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013). 
 14.  See 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, 
or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” (emphasis added)). 
 15.  See 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality rested its invo-
cation of strict scrutiny largely upon the fact that ‘statutory distinctions between the sexes often 
have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without 
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.’” (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973))). 
 16.  See 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (“[R]ace or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a 
particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other 
candidates for the available seats.”). 
 17.  505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  Nonetheless, some scholars of quite different political persua-
sions have argued that Casey only upheld Roe technically.  See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter 
Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 681 
(2004) (suggesting that Casey’s modification of Roe’s holding and rejection of Roe’s trimester 
framework “were far more than modest adjustments to Roe.  Rather, they altered the very nature 
of the abortion right, demoting it from a fundamental right to something more enigmatic and cer-
tainly more fragile”).  As one scholar noted, the Casey Court’s “undue burden test” allowed Penn-
sylvania to implement a twenty-four hour waiting period before an abortion and further permitted 
parental consent for a minor’s abortion, record keeping and reporting to the state, and informed 
consent; a majority of the Court only struck down the spousal notification requirement as impos-
ing an undue burden on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.  Id. at 682–89. 
To ascertain whether or not Casey simply upheld Roe technically or was in fact rights expan-
sive, one must do more than an analysis in policy terms of whether the Pennsylvania abortion law 
has made it more difficult or easier in the short run to obtain an abortion; one would have to ex-
plore whether the right itself is more or less fundamental by reviewing the evolution of Supreme 
Court decisions addressing this issue.  In this regard, I would argue that the Casey decision upheld 
the fundamental right to choose an abortion, and in important ways made the right more funda-
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In Lawrence v. Texas,18 the Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick19 and ex-
tended the implied fundamental rights of privacy and personhood to homo-
sexuals regarding the right of sexual intimacy.20  Regarding equal protec-
tion, in Grutter v. Bollinger21 the Rehnquist Court also reaffirmed the Bakke 
principle that race may play a role in university admissions22 and even 
heightened the level of scrutiny of gender classifications in United States v. 
Virginia.23  Most importantly, in Romer v. Evans,24 a six-to-three decision, 
the Rehnquist Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that 
required all laws relating to homosexuals to be valid only through the pro-
cess of amending its constitution.25  The Court said this initiative by the 
people was invalid because it was based on pure animus against homosexu-
als and, thus, was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.26 
Even with the addition to the Court of Chief Justice Roberts in 2005 
and Justice Alito in 2006,27 the Supreme Court refused to overrule land-
mark cases.  For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Se-
attle School District No. 1,28 the Court refused to find that race could not be 
                                                          
mental.  The jettisoning of the trimester framework in Casey was a significant step in expanding 
the right of abortion choice because it did away with medical science as the framework within 
which the right to choose abortion rested.  Arguably, Casey removed the collision course that 
would undermine the right to choose, as medical science now allows fetuses to be kept alive closer 
to conception, albeit with scientific aids, and women likewise have safer abortions closer to term.  
Also, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the most recent Supreme Court case addressing “partial birth 
abortions,” the Supreme Court reinforced the fundamentality of the right to choose, but also rec-
ognized that certain abortion methods carry greater risks.  550 U.S. 124, 156–57 (2007).  Justice 
Kennedy openly recognized the practice of lethal injections for fetuses.  Id. at 136.  Moreover, as 
both Roe and Casey seem to suggest, there remains the possibility that a state could pass a law 
today that would permit women to choose an abortion up to term so long as the law takes into 
consideration those standards of humanity espoused in Gonzales v. Carhart. 
 18.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 19.  478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 20.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law 
of the State, that declaration . . . is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination 
both in the public and in the private spheres.  The central holding of Bowers  . . . demeans the lives 
of homosexual persons.”). 
 21.  539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 22.  Id. at 336–37. 
 23.  See 518 U.S. 515, 573 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion’s 
application of intermediate scrutiny to the facts of the case, noting that “[o]nly the amorphous ‘ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification’ phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scruti-
ny, can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI’s single-sex composition is unconstitutional 
because there exist several women . . . willing and able to undertake VMI’s program”). 
 24.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 25.  Id. at 623, 627. 
 26.  Id. at 632, 635. 
 27.  See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 13. 
 28.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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a factor in attempts by school boards to diversify public schools.29  Similar-
ly, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,30 the Court under Chief Jus-
tice Roberts reaffirmed the principles of Bakke and Grutter by allowing the 
continuation of race to be one “plus factor” among many in the University 
of Texas’s undergraduate admissions process.31 
Most significantly, in United States v. Windsor,32 Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s Court not only refused to backtrack on the expansion of homosexuals’ 
rights under the Due Process Clause in Lawrence33 and under the Equal 
Protection Clause in Romer,34 but also expanded homosexuals’ rights under 
the Constitution35 by declaring the nation’s Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”) unconstitutional because it violates basic due process and equal 
protection principles by “impos[ing] a disadvantage, a separate status, and 
so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States.”36  Thus, as the aforementioned dis-
cussion suggests, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed and expanded implied 
fundamental rights and equal protection under the law during a period of 
political dominance of social conservatives, evangelical Christians, and 
other groups who otherwise viewed the protection of their definition of 
family values as a central mission of government.37  As I noted in a previ-
ous publication, social conservatives hoped that Republican appointees to 
the Supreme Court would roll back abortion rights, gay rights, affirmative 
                                                          
 29.  Id. at 735.   
 30.  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 31.  Id. at 2415–16 (2013). 
 32.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 33.  Id. at 2694.   
 34.  Id. at 2692. 
 35.  Cf. id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority emphasizes that DOMA was a 
‘systemwide enactment with no identified connection to any particular area of federal law,’ but a 
State’s definition of marriage ‘is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the 
subject of domestic relations with respect to the [p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and 
the enforcement of marital responsibilities.’  And the federal decision undermined (in the majori-
ty’s view) the ‘dignity [already] conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power,’ 
whereas a State’s decision whether to expand the definition of marriage from its traditional con-
tours involves no similar concern.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 36.  Id. at 2693 (majority opinion). 
 37.  See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage 
in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 799 (2001) 
(“Culturally, the legalization of same-sex marriage would send a message that would undermine 
the social boundaries relating to marriage and family relations.  The confusion and social roles 
linked with marriage and parenting would be tremendous, and the message of ‘anything goes’ in 
the way of sexual behavior, procreation, and parenthood would wreak its greatest havoc among 
groups of vulnerable individuals who most need the encouragement of bright line laws and clear 
social mores concerning procreative responsibility.”). 
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action policies, and the constitutional separation of church and state.38  I ar-
gued, however, that the Supreme Court has either surprisingly or unsurpris-
ingly sustained doctrine in opposition to the core values comprising the 
base of the Republican Party or expanded rights in these doctrinal areas.39 
During its tenure, the Court under Chief Justice Roberts has had an 
impact on doctrinal change by primarily opening up new avenues of doc-
trine.  For example, the Chief Justice’s Court has generally been pro-
business, dramatically reducing access to federal courts by those seeking to 
use class action suits to limit what many feel are discriminatory corporation 
policies, as well as reducing the impact of required arbitration agreements 
for those interacting with businesses.40  The Court also established an indi-
vidual right to bear arms in the District of Columbia v. Heller decision.41 
In order to explain why a conservative-moderate Supreme Court has 
expanded implied fundamental rights for homosexuals and sustained a 
woman’s right to choose, one must explore the nature of Supreme Court de-
cisionmaking, focusing in particular on how Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing either parallels or diverges from the social, economic, and political cli-
mate outside the Court.  Such a contextual analysis will also help explain 
why most social scientists and other legal scholars and experts in constitu-
tional law have failed to explain or predict the expansion of privacy rights 
and other individual liberties.42 
This Article will ask similar questions with regard to understanding the 
possibility of the development of perceived “conservative” rights principles 
in Sebelius.43  Should we expect a different trajectory of rights expansion in 
                                                          
 38.  Kahn, Why Does a Moderate/Conservative Supreme Court in a Conservative Age Expand 
Gay Rights?, supra note 12, at 174.   
 39.  Id.  
 40.  See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1431, 1472 (2013) (“[T]he Roberts Court is much friendlier to business than either the Burger or 
Rehnquist Courts . . . .  The Court is taking more cases in which the business litigant lost in the 
lower court and reversing more of these—giving rise to the paradox that a decision in which certi-
orari is granted when the lower court decision was anti-business is more likely to be reversed than 
one in which the lower court decision was pro-business.”). 
 41.  554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
 42.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuali-
ty and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 27 (“My principal suggestion here is that the Court’s 
remarkable decision in Lawrence v. Texas is best seen as a successor to Griswold v. Connecticut: 
judicial invalidation of a law that had become hopelessly out of touch with existing social convic-
tions.  So understood, Lawrence, like Griswold, reflects an American variation of the old English 
idea of desuetude.”). 
 43.  Of course, one could ask similar questions with regard to what are perceived as conserva-
tive rights defined in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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what are viewed as conservative rights? If we should expect a different tra-
jectory for conservative rights, how can the difference be explained? 
To make sense of Sebelius and the possibility of nascent rights crea-
tion in this case, I will explore how social scientists and legalists have ex-
plained Supreme Court decisionmaking as a process, with particular regard 
to its relationship to the world outside the Court.44  By doing so we can 
begin to understand how rights are created; we can also explore whether 
such rights will or will not be sustained by future Courts. 
I.  BIDIRECTIONAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING 
Two models exist for examining the relationship of the Supreme Court 
to the world outside.  Scholars who rely on Model 1, for example, seek to 
explain Court decisionmaking in unidirectional terms, either internally from 
text or precedent, or externally from the social, economic, and political real-
ities of the world outside.  Model 2 explains Court decisionmaking and doc-
trinal change as a bidirectional relationship between legal principles and 
precedents and the social, economic, and political climate outside the 
Court.45  To clarify, Model 1 explains Supreme Court decisionmaking, ei-
ther from the historical, political, social facts, and events outside the Court, 
or from text, statute, or precedent.  Model 2 explains Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking in bidirectional terms, as a mutual construction process be-
tween text, precedent, and principles coupled with the social, political, and 
historical realities of the lived lives of persons.46 
II.  THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 
The differences between the models can be better understood by look-
ing at their impact on the study of courts and constitutional law—what Bri-
                                                          
 44.  See infra Part I. 
 45.  See, e.g., Ronald Kahn, Originalism, the Living Constitution, and Supreme Court Deci-
sion Making in the Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 MD. L. REV. 25, 35 
(2012) (noting that “bi-directionality between the internal Court and the world outside occurs at 
several levels, at the level of the lived lives of citizens as the Court makes decisions about rights 
of privacy and personhood as we see in the SCP [social construction process], and at the level of 
politics itself”).  This Article will center on the use of both models to explain doctrinal change on 
the Supreme Court.  Nevertheless, these models may also be applied to decision making and doc-
trinal change in lesser federal and state courts. 
 46.  These two models are distinguishable in other respects as well.  For example, political 
scientists applying Model 1 use quantitative methods and those applying Model 2 use interpretive 
methods to study the Supreme Court and doctrinal change.  Further, both models adopt conflicting 
assumptions about the importance of Court institutional norms and process on the preference for-
mation of Justices. 
 2013]       THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 141 
an Z. Tamanaha calls the “formalist-realist divide.”47  That is, to understand 
why Model 1 dominates the analysis of Supreme Court decisionmaking, es-
pecially among most social scientists, and why Model 2 is superior in ex-
plaining Court action and doctrinal change, we need to explore the nature of 
this divide and whether the divide between formalism and realism was valid 
historically as Justices made decisions—and whether it remained valid 
when Sebelius was decided.48  I also note that many other scholars of the 
Court and common law reject the formalist-realist divide, and thus by re-
jecting it, also reject the possibility of Model I unidirectional explanations 
of Court action and doctrinal change.49 
The divide consists of the view that the 1870s through the l920s should 
be viewed as the heyday of legal formalism, a doctrine that asserts “the law 
is an internally consistent and logical body of rules that is independent from 
the variable forms of its surrounding social institutions.”50  While operating 
within the legal formalism framework, “[f]ormalist judges . . . assumed that 
law was objective, unchanging, extrinsic to the social climate, and, above 
all, different from and superior to politics.”51  The formalist vision as de-
scribed by legal realists, however, included the following premises: “(1) 
law is rationally determinate, and (2) judging is [deductive in a] mechanical 
[way]. . . . (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal rea-
sons suffices to justify a unique outcome [and] no . . . non-legal reasons 
[are] demanded or required.”52  Further, (4) the process is formal in the 
sense “that right answers could be derived from [an] autonomous, logical 
working out of the system”; and (5) legal thought is “conceptually ordered 
                                                          
 47.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 1–2 (2009) (noting that the formalist-realist divide has permeated legal cir-
cles and political science and has also shaped general historical understandings). 
 48.  Brian Tamanaha, at least, suggests that the divide is a “stranglehold.  It consists of a web 
of interlocking misinterpretations and confusions bundled in a mutually reinforcing package that 
is now virtually taken for granted.  The consequences of this collection of errors are ongoing and 
pernicious.”  Id. at 3. 
 49.  See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, JUDGES AND UNJUST LAWS: COMMON LAW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2008) (discussing how 
common law tradition gives judges the dual mandate of applying law and developing law); JAMES 
R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003) 
(arguing that common law is key to unlocking fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution and 
is a guide for judges deciding contemporary constitutional matters). 
 50.  TAMANAHA, supra note 47, at 2 (quoting MATHIEU DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: 
VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY TRADITION 98 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 51.  Id. (quoting WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 187 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 52.  Id. at 160 (quoting Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–
09 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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in that ground-level rules could all be derived from a few fundamental prin-
ciples.”53 
The other side of the divide narrative places an emphasis on legal real-
ist conceptions of judging and the study of courts, which are viewed as 
counter to conceptions of judicial formalism.54  During the 1920s and 
1930s, legal realists were charged with discrediting legal formalism; this is 
due in part to the insights of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and 
Benjamin Cardozo.55  As Brian Tamanaha writes: 
 [T]he legal realists discredited legal formalism, demonstrating 
that the law is filled with gaps and contradictions, that the law is 
indeterminate, that there are exceptions for almost every legal 
rule or principle, and that legal principles and precedents can 
support different results.  The realists argued that judges decide 
according to their personal preferences and then construct the le-
gal analysis to justify the desired outcome.56 
To this day, the divide dominates scholars’ and our nation’s vision of 
the relationship between law and politics and whether courts are to be 
viewed as primarily legal or political bodies.57  Moreover, acceptance of the 
divide and Model 1 assumptions about Supreme Court decisionmaking by 
most political scientists leads them to employ behavioral, usually quantita-
tive, “normal science” methods when explaining Court action rather than 
view the impact of Court processes and norms as causative of Court ac-
tion.58  Typically, political scientists will view all explanations of Court ac-
tion as a product of factors external to the Court, such as the following: (1) 
the ideology of the Justices; (2) the President who appointed them; (3) the 
legal advocacy process; or (4) the social, political, and economic world out-
side the Court.59 
                                                          
 53.  Id. (quoting Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09 
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54.  Id. at 1. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 1–2 (“Until the twentieth century, most lawyers and scholars believed that judging 
was a mechanistic enterprise in which judges applied the law and rendered decisions without re-
course to their own ideological or policy preferences. . . .  In the 1920s, however, a group of jurists 
and legal philosophers, known collectively as ‘legal realists,’ recognized that judicial discretion 
was quite broad and that often the law did not mandate a particular result.” (quoting VIRGINIA A. 
HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL 
COURT 30 (2006))).   
 58.  See id. at 132–55 (noting that “[q]uantitative studies of judging are burgeoning” and dis-
cussing the findings of these studies). 
 59.  Common law judges likewise “accommodated the law to social circumstances[,]” as Bri-
an Tamanaha notes, even further suggesting that “[a] multitude of common law judges and ju-
rists . . . have declared that the consideration, subconsciously and consciously, by judges of social 
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Scholars who employ Model 2 assumptions of bidirectionality and 
view the presence of a mutual construction process involving internal insti-
tutional and precedential factors, as well as external factors typically reject 
normal science and quantitative methods for explaining Court action.60  In-
stead, proponents of the Model 2 approach use interpretive methods, which 
rest on methodological assumptions employed by what has been referred to 
as the historical institutional or political development approach.61  Methods 
used in both models are empirical—thus, one could label Model 1 methods 
as empirical behavioral and Model 2 methods as empirical interpretive. 
Brian Tamanaha demonstrates, however, that the divide has always 
been a myth because, since the founding of our nation, Justices and judges 
have rejected such a divide between formalist law and the realist world out-
side the Court’s decisionmaking.  Ironically, when analyzing the scholar-
ship of the leading legal realists, it becomes apparent that they too reject the 
divide.62  Because Model 2 assumptions about Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing and methods of analysis reject the divide and bring the realist world 
outside the Court into its application of principles and precedents,63 they 
have a better chance of explaining the development of individual rights—
whether these be progressive rights or the nascent conservative rights de-
fined by five Justices in Sebelius. 
In analyzing Sebelius, we first must look at what polity and rights 
principles are raised in each of the opinions and how these principles are 
constructed.  Do both liberal and conservative Justices employ arguments 
that are based on a bidirectionality between principles and the lived lives of 
individuals?  Are there different levels of polity principles?  Additionally, 
are there different levels of social and economic constructions used to ex-
                                                          
interests, customs, morals, and purposes is integral to the common law system of judging.”  Id. at 
175. 
 60.  See supra text accompanying note 56.  For a contextual understanding of the underpin-
nings of the Model 2 approach, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
REV. 457, 465 (1897) (“[I]n the broadest sense it is true that the law is a logical development, like 
everything else.  The danger of which I speak is not the admission that the principles governing 
other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be 
worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct.”). 
 61.  For a description of the institutional approach, see TAMANAHA, supra note 47, at 194–95 
(“The institutional context of judging blankets judges in multiple legal layers.  Judges make legal 
decisions surrounded by colleagues, within a stable hierarchical institution, with the participation 
of and under the gaze of a legally trained audience of participants and observers.  Lawyers, law 
clerks, fellow judges, and legal academics engage with judges in working out legal an-
swers . . . .”). 
 62.  See id. at 3 (“The objective of this book is to free us from the formalist-realist strangle-
hold. . . . .Rooting out the formalist-realist story will help us recover a sound understanding of 
judging.” (emphasis added)). 
 63.  See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
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plain the nature of the principles and whether the mandate is constitutional?  
Do the polity and rights principles articulated in Sebelius make sense at the 
level of principle and social construction in light of prior cases?  Is choos-
ing not to purchase health insurance similar to actions in prior cases for 
which the Court permitted regulation under the Commerce Clause?  What 
do these findings suggest about the long-term permanence of the inaction-
action distinction that is at the core of the decisions by Chief Justice Rob-
erts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, and that is criticized in the opinion 
of Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor?64 
Using Model 2 assumptions and methods, the Court analyzed both pol-
ity and rights principles and social and economic constructions to ascertain 
whether an individual has a constitutional right to refuse to purchase health 
insurance—and whether the government, in forcing one into the stream of 
interstate commerce by mandating that he or she purchase health insurance, 
violates that constitutional right.65 
As we explore below, the polity principles defined by Chief Justice 
Roberts exist at multiple levels of abstraction—from a general statement of 
Court deference to political institutions, where a constitutionally permissi-
ble argument can be made, to more complex polity principles of federal-
ism.66  Most importantly, as the following discussion will demonstrate, the 
opinion contains numerous references to the relationship between Com-
                                                          
 64.  Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (majority 
opinion) (“Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things.  In some cases they de-
cide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do it.  Allowing Congress to justify federal 
regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an 
individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation . . . .”), with id. at 2622 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In concluding that the Commerce Clause 
does not permit Congress to regulate commercial ‘inactivity,’ and therefore does not allow Con-
gress to adopt the practical solution it devised for the health-care problem, [the Chief Justice] 
views the Clause as a ‘technical legal conception,’ precisely what our case law tells us not to do.” 
(quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122 (1942))). 
 65.  In fact, both the majority and dissenting opinions incorporate the substantive and eco-
nomic rights discussions in their respective analyses.  See, e.g., id. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“A mandate to purchase a particular product would be uncon-
stitutional if, for example, the edict impermissibly abridged the freedom of speech, interfered with 
the free exercise of religion, or infringed on a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”); see also id. at 2589 (majority opinion) (“To an economist, perhaps, there is no differ-
ence between activity and inactivity; both have measurable economic effects on commerce.”). 
 66.  See id. at 2594 (noting that, as the Supreme Court has long explained, “‘every reasonable 
construction [of a statute] must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” 
(quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))); see also id. at 2676–77 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“Structural protections—notably, the restraints imposed by federalism and separation of 
powers—are less romantic and have less obvious a connection to personal freedom than the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights . . . .  It should be the responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to 
remind our people that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most im-
portant ones . . . .”). 
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merce Clause principles, protection of individual rights, and reduction in 
the abuse of government power. 
At the core of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, as well as the opinions 
of those Justices in opposition to the Chief Justice’s stance, is the question 
of whether the inaction-action distinction, as a basis for a denial of rights or 
a liberty interest of individuals, is valid under the Commerce Clause.67  Jus-
tices on both sides of the debate articulated the action-inaction dichotomy in 
conflicting fashions.68  Questions on this precise issue abound, and the dual 
and conflicting interpretations of the inaction-action distinction further sow 
confusion in this area.  Thus, under Commerce Clause principles, when cit-
izens must pay the mandate after choosing not to purchase health insurance, 
should this be considered action or inaction within the economic market, 
and thus subject or not subject to regulation by Congress?  Is the failure to 
buy health insurance inaction or action, particularly with respect to whether 
such action has an effect upon commerce?  As previously noted, and in sum, 
the inaction-action distinction speaks directly to the following question—is 
there a right or liberty interest in refusing to be a participant in the market 
and interstate commerce? 
Justices in Sebelius, through the lens of prior Commerce Clause cases, 
including Wickard v. Filburn,69 Perez v. United States,70 United States v. 
Lopez,71 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,72 and Katzenbach v. 
McClung,73 considered what types of actions would trigger permissible 
government regulation under the Commerce Clause.74  Additionally, could 
                                                          
 67.  As Chief Justice Roberts articulates with respect to the action-inaction distinction, “[t]he 
individual mandate’s regulation of the uninsured as a class is, in fact, particularly divorced from 
any link to existing commercial activity. . . .  If the individual mandate is targeted at a class, it is a 
class whose commercial inactivity rather than activity is its defining feature.”  Id. at 2590 (majori-
ty opinion). 
 68.  As Justice Ginsburg articulates in her opinion, for example, “[i]t is not hard to show the 
difficulty courts (and Congress) would encounter in distinguishing statutes that regulate ‘activity’ 
from those that regulate ‘inactivity,’” further relying upon one scholar, who noted that “‘it is pos-
sible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with the same effect.’”  Id. at 2622 (Gins-
burg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 
(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989)). 
 69.  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 70.  402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
 71.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 72.  379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 73.  379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 74.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (majority 
opinion) (noting that, while “[t]he path of [the Supreme Court’s] Commerce Clause decisions has 
not always run smooth, . . . it is now well established that Congress has broad authority under the 
Clause”).  With respect to the individual mandate in particular, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out 
one important shortcoming—namely, that while Commerce Clause power is quite expansive in 
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an aggregate of many lesser actions by citizens trigger permissible govern-
ment regulation under the Commerce Clause? 
Also, because issues of social and health policy are involved in Sebe-
lius, Justices must explore the nature of the health care market, that is, 
whether it is national, state, or local in scope; the place of individual per-
sons in that market; and whether the health care market is different from 
other markets that past Commerce Clause jurisprudence has permitted Con-
gress to regulate.  The following question may help better frame this com-
plex issue—is buying health insurance or paying the mandate simply an in-
dividual economic action, or do the collective choices of whether to buy 
health insurance, taken together, affect the market?   
Answering all of these questions will not only determine whether the 
government can ensure health coverage for most persons, as a social policy, 
but also whether these new Commerce Clause principles—and the new 
right advocated by the majority on the question of the constitutionality of 
the mandate—will impact future economic and social policy initiatives by 
government.  Definitions of polity and rights principles, and the construc-
tions of such principles in past cases as compared to the same principles and 
their construction at issue in Sebelius, delineate the contours of legal argu-
ments addressing this issue, the rights as defined or rejected by the Justices, 
and, ultimately, whether such rights, as defined under the inaction-action 
distinction, have a long-term staying power. 
The central question in this Article, therefore, is not whether the ACA 
was constitutional because five Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts, 
formally stated as much. Rather, the question is why the ACA is constitu-
tional—particularly, whether, in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, the man-
date was constitutional under the power to tax,75 or whether, under the view 
of four other Justices (Breyer, Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor), the man-
date was a legitimate government regulation under Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce.76  Putting the question more simply, does any limitation 
                                                          
scope, “Congress has never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals not engaged in 
commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”  Id. at 2586. 
 75.  See id. at 2595 (noting that, while the Affordable Care Act describes the payment as a 
penalty rather than a tax, the Court has “similarly held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless 
were authorized by Congress’s power to tax”). 
 76.  As Justice Ginsburg stated in her opinion, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
has traditionally been guided by two principles: (1) “Congress has the power to regulate economic 
activities ‘that substantially affect interstate commerce’”; and (2) the Court “owe[s] a large meas-
ure of respect to Congress when it frames and enacts economic and social legislation.”  Id. at 2616 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 
(2005)).  Thus, as Justice Ginsburg further noted, “[s]traightforward application of these principles 
would require the Court to hold that the minimum coverage provision [of the Act] is proper 
Commerce Clause legislation.”  Id. at 2617.   
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exist under the Commerce Clause whereby the government would lack the 
power to force an individual into an economic market based on a nascent 
liberty interest? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze how the majority 
and dissenting opinions in this case constructed such a right and limitation 
on Congress’s power over economic and social policy, and how they ana-
lyzed the feared slippery slope concerns.77  Several additional questions 
subsequently surface  Will Sebelius be viewed as the harbinger of a right or 
liberty interest under the Commerce Clause?  Will Sebelius be the case that 
harkens much closer scrutiny of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause by redefining the contours of what constitutes a liberty interest?  Fi-
nally, will Sebelius follow Reed v. Reed,78 the case that triggered higher 
Court scrutiny of gender classifications under the Equal Protection 
Clause?79 
III.  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S MAJORITY OPINION ADDRESSING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACA 
A.  First Look: Court Deference to Congress 
At first glance, Chief Justice Roberts appears to be quite deferential to 
political branches when they implement policy.80  The Chief Justice be-
lieves that when a constitutionally permissible basis for government power 
may be found, the Court should not declare a law unconstitutional.81  As the 
Chief Justice writes, “it is well established that if a statute has two possible 
meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the 
meaning that does not do so.”82 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes that the Court must 
strike down laws that transgress the limits of government powers;83 to base 
the individual mandate on the Commerce power is such a transgression for 
                                                          
 77.  See infra Parts III–V. 
 78.  404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 79.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 772 (4th 
ed. 2011) (noting Reed v. Reed’s role in the “emergence of intermediate scrutiny”). 
 80.  Cf. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (majority opinion) (“Our permissive reading of [Con-
gress’s power to tax and to regulate commerce] is explained in part by a general reticence to inval-
idate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders. . . . [Nonetheless, o]ur deference in matters of policy 
cannot, however, become abdication in matters of law.”). 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. at 2593. 
 83.  Id. at 2579–80. 
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the Chief Justice.84  Nonetheless, when Chief Justice Roberts found a con-
stitutionally permissible basis for the individual mandate under the taxing 
power, he chose to support the longstanding polity principle of deference to 
political branches.85  As Chief Justice Roberts writes, citing past precedent, 
“‘every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a stat-
ute from unconstitutionality.’”86 
Even though Chief Justice Roberts opposes the Commerce Clause as 
the constitutional basis for the individual mandate, he starts with a view that 
the Commerce power can be expansive when individual actions “substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.”87  Citing Wickard v. Filburn as an exam-
ple, Chief Justice Roberts states that “[t]he power over activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce can be expansive.  That power has 
been held to authorize federal regulation of such seemingly local matters as 
a farmer’s decision to grow wheat . . . .”88  Further, citing Perez v. United 
States, Chief Justice Roberts likewise accepts the legitimacy of government 
regulations that seek to stop actions such as extortionate payments by 
butchers to loan sharks because these actions substantially affect interstate 
commerce.89 
Chief Justice Roberts also appears to support major legal principles 
under the Commerce Clause as applied to the individual mandate and the 
ACA.  He agrees that, by requiring individuals to purchase health insur-
ance, the individual mandate prevents cost shifting from those who pur-
chase health insurance to those who ordinarily would not purchase health 
insurance.90  However, as Chief Justice Roberts recognizes, the individual 
                                                          
 84.  See id. at 2590–91 (“Everyone will likely participate in the markets for food, clothing, 
transportation, shelter, or energy; that does not authorize Congress to direct them to purchase par-
ticular products in those or other markets today.  The Commerce Clause is not a general license to 
regulate an individual from cradle to grave . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 85.  See id. at 2599 (“Whether the mandate can be upheld under the Commerce Clause is a 
question about the scope of federal authority.  Its answer depends on whether Congress can exer-
cise what all acknowledge to be the novel course of directing individuals to purchase insurance.  
Congress’s use of the Taxing Clause to encourage buying something is, by contrast, not new. . . . 
Sustaining the mandate as a tax depends only on whether Congress has properly exercised its tax-
ing power to encourage purchasing health insurance, not whether it can.”). 
 86.  Id. at 2594 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)). 
 87.  Id. at 2578 (internal citation omitted). 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 2579.  But cf. id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I adhere to my view that ‘the 
very notion of a substantial effects test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the origi-
nal understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.’” 
(second internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 90.  Id. at 2585 (majority opinion). 
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mandate opens up the possibility of a concerning free-rider dilemma.91  
Chief Justice Roberts also agrees that the Commerce power is not limited to 
individual actions that substantially affect interstate commerce; Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause also extends to individual activities that 
affect commerce in the aggregate.92 
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts’s proposal that there be an inac-
tion-action dichotomy and a liberty interest under the Commerce Clause 
demonstrates the revolutionary nature of his decision. 
B.  The Inaction-Action Dichotomy 
For the Chief Justice, the problem with ruling the mandate constitu-
tional under Commerce Clause principles is that “Congress has never at-
tempted to rely on that [Commerce] power to compel individuals not en-
gaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”93  Congress’s 
“power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial ac-
tivity to be regulated.”94  The power to regulate, however, does not amount 
to the “power to create.”95  As Chief Justice Roberts states: “The language 
of the Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regu-
late assumes there is already something to be regulated.”96  Furthermore, all 
Commerce Clause cases “uniformly describe the power as reaching ‘activi-
ty.’ . . .  The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing com-
mercial activity.  It instead compels individuals to become active in com-
merce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so 
affects interstate commerce.”97  According to Chief Justice Roberts, the de-
cision not to purchase health insurance means that individuals are not im-
mersed in the stream of interstate commerce, but rather are otherwise 
                                                          
 91.  See id. (“[T]he mandate forces into the insurance risk pool more healthy individuals, 
whose premiums on average will be higher than their health care expenses.  This allows insurers 
to subsidize the costs of covering the unhealthy individuals the reforms require them to accept.”).  
But see id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[The Chief Justice] 
also calls the minimum coverage provision an illegitimate effort to make young, healthy individu-
als subsidize insurance premiums paid by the less hale and hardy.  This complaint, too, is spuri-
ous. . . .  By requiring the healthy uninsured to obtain insurance . . . the minimum coverage provi-
sion ends the free ride these individuals currently enjoy.”). 
 92.  See id. at 2586 (majority opinion) (“Congress’s power, moreover, is not limited to regula-
tion of an activity that by itself substantially affects interstate commerce, but also extends to activ-
ities that do so only when aggregated with similar activities of others.”). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 2587. 
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brought into the stream of interstate commerce by government requirements 
under the individual mandate. 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes that the failure to 
purchase health insurance is not action, but rather a decision not to enter a 
market (the economic system);98 therefore, this decision cannot be the basis 
for government regulation (in this case, the individual mandate).99  Thus, 
according to Chief Justice Roberts, the decision not to purchase health in-
surance should not be a predicate for government regulation because such 
decision does not constitute an act that government has the capacity or 
power to regulate in the first place.  Chief Justice Roberts’s construction of 
inaction,100 which Justice Ginsburg opposes in her dissenting opinion,101 as-
sumes that a conscious choice not to purchase health insurance consequent-
ly embodies a conscious decision not to act in the economic system. 
In sum, as discussed throughout this Article, the difference between 
the majority and dissenting opinions on the individual mandate turns on 
how that act of choice is constructed.  Can the Court ultimately construe 
that an act, either by an individual or in the aggregate, substantially affects 
commerce?  Moreover, it is important to note that the difference also turns 
on the conflicting positions taken by both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions on the question of whether a person has a liberty interest in being left 
alone by the government.  One can ask what the difference is between the 
decision not to buy insurance, which Chief Justice Roberts believes cannot 
be regulated under the Commerce Clause, and the decision by the farmer in 
Wickard to grow wheat used on his farm rather than follow a government 
regulation that limited the amount he could grow.  It is precisely the com-
parison of these economic and social constructions that is at the core of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s call in Sebelius for a new liberty interest under the 
Commerce Clause. 
                                                          
 98.  See id. at 2589 (“To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and 
inactivity; both have measurable economic effects on commerce.  But the distinction between do-
ing something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were ‘practical 
statesmen,’ not metaphysical philosophers.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 99.  Chief Justice Roberts concludes that this is so, in part, because permitting “Congress to 
justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless 
decisions an individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation[.]” Id. at 
2587. 
 100.  Chief Justice Roberts, as an extreme articulation of the inaction-action distinction, noted 
that “the Government’s logic would justify a mandatory purchase to solve almost any problem.”  
Id. at 2588. 
 101.  See infra Part IV.B (providing an overview of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in greater de-
tail). 
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C.  To Regulate Rather Than Compel 
Chief Justice Roberts makes what he believes is a clear distinction be-
tween the government’s power to regulate commerce and its power to com-
pel it.102  A look at Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion demonstrates what 
she perceives to be Chief Justice Roberts’s refusal to prospectively define 
the health care market, choosing instead to define the health care market 
with respect to the “here and now.”103  However, because the provision of 
health care is now “a concern of national dimension,”104 Justice Ginsburg 
notes that Justices should be cognizant of the following facets of this na-
tional health care market: (1) the unpredictability of sickness;105 (2) indi-
viduals are constantly operating in the health care marketplace because, at 
some point, these individuals will become sick and affect the health care 
market, whether or not these individuals have paid for insurance;106 and (3) 
the difference between regulating classes of activities that affect the market, 
such as the growing of marijuana or not buying health insurance, compared 
to regulating individuals assumed to be at rest.107  Thus, the uninsured are 
not simply individuals seeking to be left alone, but are rather individuals 
who have made the conscious decision not to pay for the social and eco-
nomic effects of their choices. 
IV.  CONGRESS MAY NOT REGULATE INDIVIDUALS NOW BECAUSE OF 
“PROPHESIZED FUTURE ACTIVITY” 
A.  Race Discrimination and Interstate Commerce 
Chief Justice Roberts refuses to accept the long-time precedent under 
the Commerce Clause that “Congress may dictate the conduct of an indi-
vidual today because of prophesied future activity[.]”108  Citing both Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung, which 
                                                          
 102.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2589. 
 103.  See id. at 2619 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (further noting 
that “it is Congress’ role, not the Court’s, to delineate the boundaries of the market the Legislature 
seeks to regulate”). 
 104.  Id. at 2609. 
 105.  Id. at 2610. 
 106.  This facet is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, according to Justice Ginsburg, 
“[c]ollectively, Americans spent $2.5 trillion on health care in 2009, accounting for 17.6% of our 
Nation’s economy.” Id. at 2609. 
 107.  Chief Justice Roberts likewise acknowledges this distinction, pointing out that “[o]ur 
precedents recognize Congress’s power to regulate ‘class[es] of activities,’  not classes of individ-
uals, apart from any activity in which they are engaged.”  Id. at 2590 (majority opinion) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 108.  Id. 
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prohibited discrimination by hotel operators and restaurant owners due to 
the effect of such acts on commerce,109 Chief Justice Roberts admits, how-
ever, that “[the Court has] said that Congress can anticipate the effects on 
commerce of an economic activity.”110  Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts 
sees a distinction between the Commerce Clause basis for outlawing race 
discrimination in public accommodations and in allowing the mandate un-
der the ACA.  As the Chief Justice writes: “We have never permitted Con-
gress to anticipate that activity itself in order to regulate individuals not cur-
rently engaged in commerce.”111  Thus, the Chief Justice emphasizes that 
all Commerce Clause cases have involved “preexisting economic activi-
ty.”112 
Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts implied that one of the ancillary 
reasons the Court provided in Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach in 
support of its decision to outlaw discrimination in public accommodations 
was the fact that many African-Americans and others chose not to act—that 
is, African-Americans chose to refuse to engage in interstate travel because 
of expected race discrimination, a choice that also affected the economy.113  
How is the choice not to enter the economic system by refusing to travel 
different from choosing not to purchase health insurance?  Arguably, both 
decisions are “inactions.”  How can the decisions by African-Americans not 
to engage in interstate travel be grounds for regulation of public accommo-
dations, but the choice not to purchase health insurance not be a basis for 
government regulation of this choice? 
                                                          
 109.  Id.  As the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, noted, on the one hand, “It is said that the 
operation of the motel here is of a purely local character.  But, assuming this to be true, ‘[i]f it is 
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies 
the squeeze.’”  379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (quoting United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. 
Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).  Further, in Katzenbach,—decided the same day as Heart of 
Atlanta Motel—the Court likewise noted that “Congress has determined for itself that refusals of 
service to Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate flow of food and upon the 
movement of products generally.  Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular 
activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this Court.  
But where we find that the legislators . . . have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory 
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.”  379 U.S. 294, 
303–04 (1964). 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2590. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See supra text accompanying notes 111–112; see also, e.g., Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300 
(noting that “there was an impressive array of testimony that discrimination in restaurants had a 
direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes.  This resulted, it was said, 
because discriminatory practices prevent Negroes from buying prepared food served on the prem-
ises while on a trip, except in isolated and unkempt restaurants and under most unsatisfactory and 
often unpleasant conditions.  This obviously discourages travel and obstructs interstate commerce 
for one can hardly travel without eating.” (emphasis added)). 
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Finally, as previously stated, although Chief Justice Roberts at first 
appears to support the principle of Court deference to political branches 
when a constitutionally viable way can be found to support social and eco-
nomic legislation,114 he further suggests in Sebelius that the Court, not Con-
gress, should have the power to choose the economic principles that are to 
apply in deciding whether the mandate is constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause.  As the Chief Justice writes: “To an economist, perhaps, 
there is no difference between activity and inactivity; both have measurable 
economic effects on commerce.  But the distinction between doing some-
thing and doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were 
‘practical statesmen,’ not metaphysical philosophers.”115  The fact that the 
Founders did not have such a view of economic relationships is not an ef-
fective screen partitioning off inaction and action in light of the long history 
of Court precedents since the Founding. 
B.  Chief Justice Roberts’s Slippery Slope 
For the Chief Justice, one of the most important aspects of federalism 
in shaping the power of government is the relationship between the princi-
ples of federalism and the liberty of individuals.116  Therefore, when he 
thinks about national and state power under the Commerce Clause, a rights 
concept is generally looming large in the background.  Quoting directly 
from New York v. United States,117 Chief Justice Roberts writes: “‘State 
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens 
the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’”118  Chief 
Justice Roberts emphasizes that federalism and divided power between the 
national and state government limits the arbitrary use of power by the na-
tional government.119  Therefore, Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause must be addressed with an eye toward ascertaining whether a broad, 
general federal police power will be expanded at the expense of the more 
localized police power of the states.120 
                                                          
 114.  See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.  
 115.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2589 (internal citation omitted). 
 116.  See id. at 2578 (“‘By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the con-
cerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.’” (quot-
ing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011))). 
 117.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 118.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 
(1992)). 
 119.  See supra text accompanying notes 116, 118 and accompanying text. 
 120.  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (“Because the police power is controlled by 50 different 
States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives 
are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.  The Framers thus en-
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Chief Justice Roberts fears that permitting the individual mandate to 
pass muster under the Commerce Clause based on inaction would create a 
slippery slope—that is, it would create a “‘great substantive and independ-
ent powers’ beyond those specifically enumerated.”121  For similar reasons, 
the Chief Justice determined that such power is not permissible under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause because such powers are derivative of others 
in the Constitution—in this case, under the Commerce Clause.122  As dis-
cussed below, the dissenters view the Necessary and Proper Clause in much 
more expansive terms.123  Most importantly, Chief Justice Roberts identifies 
a slippery slope that would surface if the Court entertained that such “inac-
tion” could be the basis of national government regulation under the Com-
merce Clause.  Chief Justice Roberts suggests that this slippery slope will 
lead to a wide abuse of government power: 
 Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regu-
late individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would 
open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authori-
ty.  Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things.  
In some cases they decide not to do something; in others they 
simply fail to do it.124 
Thus, at the core of the Sebelius decision is a slippery slope—that if 
we allow the government to apply the Commerce Clause to a decision not 
to act or enter interstate commerce, then any failure of persons to take posi-
tive action to meet a social or economic problem could be regulated precise-
ly due to the effects of such failure to act.125  As Chief Justice Roberts 
writes: “Indeed, the Government’s logic would justify a mandatory pur-
chase to solve almost any problem.”126  He believes that the Constitution 
does not “authorize[] Congress to use its commerce power to compel citi-
                                                          
sured that powers . . . were held by governments more local and more accountable than a distant 
federal bureaucracy. . . .  This case concerns two powers that the Constitution does grant the Fed-
eral Government, but which must be read carefully to avoid creating a general federal authority 
akin to the police power.”). 
 121.  Id. at 2591 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 421 (1819)). 
 122.  Id. at 2592. 
 123.  See, e.g., id. at 2627 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing 
Chief Justice Roberts for failing to explain “why the power to direct either the purchase of health 
insurance or, alternatively, the payment of a penalty collectible as a tax is more far-reaching than 
other implied powers this Court has found meet under the Necessary and Proper Clause”). 
 124.  Id. at 2587 (majority opinion). 
 125.  Chief Justice Roberts uses, as an extreme example, that most Americans have poor diets.  
Id. at 2588.  As such, Chief Justice Roberts notes that “[t]he failure of that group to have a healthy 
diet increases health care costs, to a greater extent than the failure of the uninsured to purchase 
insurance.”  Id.  Would it make sense, as the Chief Justice suggests, to “address the diet problem 
by ordering everyone to buy vegetables”?  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
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zens to act as the Government would have them act.”127  The Chief Justice 
views this principle of regulating the effects of inaction as “fundamentally 
changing the relation[ship] between the citizen and the Federal Govern-
ment.”128 
V.  DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE COMMERCE AND TAXING POWERS 
A.  Getting Rid of the Slippery Slope 
The difference between the suitability of the constitutional justification 
for the individual mandate under the taxing power rather than the commerce 
power is related to the way in which the Chief Justice constructs the failure 
to purchase health insurance.  For the reasons outlined below, Chief Justice 
Roberts views granting the constitutionality of the individual mandate under 
Congress’s power to tax as not threatening individual liberty. 
Foremost, the slippery slope that he fears regarding government regu-
lation of “inaction” under the Commerce Clause is not as ominous under 
the taxing power.129  Chief Justice Roberts does not view the choice not to 
buy health insurance that “triggers a tax” as constituting “a legal command 
to buy insurance.”130  Arguably, the Chief Justice still has difficulty at-
tempting to justify the mandate as a tax.  This is so because he concedes 
that, operationally, the individual mandate functions as a tax even though it 
has at times been labeled a penalty.131  Chief Justice Roberts also concedes 
that this payment will certainly impact individual behavior, noting that 
“[n]one of this is to say that the payment is not intended to affect individual 
conduct.”132  Moreover, he notes that the failure to purchase health insur-
ance is enforced through the tax system, not the criminal justice system—an 
individual is not considered an outlaw for failing to purchase health insur-
ance, regardless of the reasons.133  While taxes concern practical applica-
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 2589. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 2599–600.  This is so for three primary reasons, as the Chief Justice notes: (1) “it is 
abundantly clear the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through 
inactivity”; (2) “Congress’s ability to use its taxing power to influence conduct is not without lim-
its”; and (3) “although the breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its power to regulate 
commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control over individual 
behavior.”  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 2594. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at 2596. 
 133.  See id. at 2597 (“That Congress apparently regards such extensive failure to comply with 
the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it was creating four million outlaws.  
It suggests instead that the shared responsibility payment merely imposes a tax citizens may law-
fully choose to pay in lieu of buying health insurance.”). 
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tions and should be analyzed in functional terms, Commerce Clause issues 
involve more complex concerns such as federalism and basic liberty inter-
ests. 
Even though determining whether the payment passes muster under 
Congress’s taxing power requires a more straightforward, “functional ap-
proach,”134 one should still ask why a penalty under Congress’s taxing 
power does not similarly raise slippery slope concerns.  At a basic level, 
Chief Justice Roberts views an individual paying a tax for failing to pur-
chase health insurance as fundamentally different from an individual being 
forced by the government to purchase health insurance.135  He notes that 
taxes primarily involve incentives, and that Congress’s use of its taxing 
power to encourage an individual to purchase something is not a new con-
cept.136  Lastly, the Chief Justice also does not view this tax as an outlawed 
direct tax on individuals because it is not a capitation tax paid by all.137 
With respect to the individual mandate, Chief Justice Roberts permits 
the “payment’s practical characteristics” to form the constitutional basis for 
Congress’s taxing power in this case.138  Practicalities such as the place of 
the individual in the health care market and the place of the mandate as it 
affects that same market with respect to Commerce Clause principles are 
not allowed.  As Justice Ginsburg opines: Why is this so, particularly given 
the trajectory of Commerce Clause jurisprudence?139 
A key difference exists between basing the constitutionality of the 
mandate on the commerce versus the taxing power.  As Chief Justice Rob-
erts writes: “First, and most importantly, it is abundantly clear the Constitu-
tion does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactiv-
ity.”140  Unlike Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, therefore, 
there is no promise that one may escape taxation given abstention from reg-
                                                          
 134.  Id. at 2595. 
 135.  Cf. id. at 2596–97 (“While the individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of 
health insurance, it need not be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful.  Neither the Act 
nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond 
requiring a payment to the IRS.”). 
 136.  Id. at 2596. 
 137.  Id. at 2599. 
 138.  Id. at 2600. 
 139.  See id. at 2600–01 (“Justice G[insburg] questions the necessity of rejecting the Govern-
ment’s commerce power argument, given that § 5000A can be upheld under the taxing power.  
But the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax, and I would up-
hold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it.  It is only because the Commerce Clause does 
not authorize such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question.  And it is 
only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that § 5000A can be 
interpreted as a tax.”). 
 140.  Id. at 2599. 
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ulated or taxable activity.  Accordingly, the inaction-action distinction, at 
least for Chief Justice Roberts, is not central to the taxing power.  Further, 
as previously noted, Congress’s use of the taxing power “to encourage buy-
ing something is . . . not new.”141 
What this boils down to is that there is no directness of government 
power over individual choice if the mandate is permitted under the taxing 
power; there is, however, a directness if the mandate is allowed under the 
Commerce Clause.  This distinction is key to Chief Justice Roberts’s fear of 
the slippery slope.  He believes that validating the individual mandate under 
the Commerce Clause, rather than justifying it under the taxing power, 
would create a slippery slope because it would provide the government with 
more direct control over individuals both now and in the future.142  The 
economic construction here is that the directness of government action is 
much greater given the feared slippery slope of government power, and thus 
requires a liberty interest, or cocoon, to be defined under the Commerce 
Clause.  Articulating his fear of the slippery slope, Chief Justice Roberts 
states: “Once we recognize that Congress may regulate a particular decision 
under the Commerce Clause, the Federal Government can bring its full 
weight to bear.  Congress may simply command individuals to do as it di-
rects.  An individual who disobeys may be subjected to criminal sanc-
tions.”143  In fact, one can see a slippery slope of possible sanctions clearly 
outlined in the majority opinion: (1) “fines and imprisonment”; (2) branding 
as a criminal; (3) “deprivation of otherwise protected civil rights, such as 
the right to bear arms or vote in elections”; (4) “loss of employment oppor-
tunities”; and (5) “social stigma.”144  Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes that, 
“[b]y contrast, Congress’s authority under the taxing power is limited to re-
quiring an individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, [and] no 
more.”145 
The Chief Justice’s opinion thus demonstrates that at the core of his 
decision are polity principles such as federalism and separation of powers, 
including, at a more basic level, the relationship between both the Court and 
Congress in interpreting the Commerce Clause and whether the individual 
mandate is constitutional under this clause rather than under Congress’s 
taxing power.146  Importantly, these principles have no context without 
                                                          
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 2601. 
 143.  Id. at 2600. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  See, e.g., id. at 2608 (“The Framers created a Federal Government of limited powers, and 
assigned to this Court the duty of enforcing those limits.  The Court does so today.  But the Court 
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Chief Justice Roberts engaging in an economic construction process and 
drawing analogies between the construction processes of the individual 
mandate as compared to the economic constructions of prior Commerce and 
Taxing Clause jurisprudence.  Moreover, in drawing these analogies, it is 
simply not possible to sustain a formalist-realist divide; formalist legal 
principles and realist factors mutually construct each other in determining 
whether the mandate is constitutional under Congress’s commerce or taxing 
power.  Thus, Model 2 bidirectional explanations of Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking are necessary to understand the opinions of all Justices—
whether they are liberal, moderate, or conservative. 
Notably, this very same process of decisionmaking has an eye to the 
future, as is evident in Chief Justice Roberts’s attempt to establish the dif-
ference between inaction and action and a liberty interest under the Com-
merce Clause.147  We will see a similar bidirectional process of deci-
sionmaking at work in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, with quite 
different definitions of principles and social constructions in light of prece-
dent.148 
To counter the slippery slope, Chief Justice Roberts seeks to establish 
a new right or principle, a liberty interest under the Commerce Clause, 
without the need to do so.  The Chief Justice could have only spoken to the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate under the taxing power.  He also 
could have chosen not to brighten the line between action and inaction and 
to allow the political branches to define such a line using modern concepts 
of economic causation.  Therefore, one must conclude that Chief Justice 
Roberts (and the four other Justices who supported his analysis) appears to 
seek a new economic liberty interest under the Commerce Clause.149  As 
evidenced by Sebelius, this is another example of the fact that conservative 
Justices, not simply progressives, are non-minimalist or maximalist in their 
decisionmaking. 
B.  Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg, who is joined by Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and 
Kagan, alternatively opines that the ACA and the mandate are constitutional 
                                                          
does not express any opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act.  Under the Constitution, 
that judgment is reserved to the people.”). 
 147.  See supra Part V.A.  
 148.  See infra Part V.B. 
 149.  See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Affordable Care Act Litigation: The Standing Paradox, 38 
AM. J.L. & MED. 410, 415 (2012) (“To be sure, there are plausible individual rights objections to 
the requirement to purchase health insurance, including interference with autonomous healthcare 
decisionmaking and freedom of contract.  At the core, the objections sound in libertarian rights 
and economic liberty to be free from government coercion.”). 
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under the Commerce Clause.150  However, at the core of Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion is a point-by-point attack on each of the following: (1) Chief Justice 
Roberts’s articulation of the inaction-action dichotomy; (2) the liberty inter-
est that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Ken-
nedy seek to establish; and (3) the unfounded fear of a slippery slope lead-
ing to wide abuse of congressional powers in the future should the ACA 
and the individual mandate be declared constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause.151  The centerpiece of Justice Ginsburg’s discussion of the inaction-
action dichotomy and the liberty interest, however, is her endeavor to en-
gage in a law-drawing exercise to make sense of this dichotomy.152  Fur-
ther, Justice Ginsburg also points to the absurdity of the “chain of infer-
ences” that would result if, for example, the Court were to accept Chief 
Justice Roberts’s economic construction that a “vegetable-purchase man-
date” somehow substantially affects interstate commerce.153 
In addition to addressing the absurdity of the inaction-action dichoto-
my in light of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Justice Ginsburg also ex-
plores the polity principles at the core of congressional and Court power 
under the Commerce Clause.154  She analyzes these constructions in light of 
their applicability to those at the core of the inaction-action dichotomy, ul-
timately concluding that “[w]hen contemplated in its extreme, almost any 
power looks dangerous.  The commerce power, hypothetically, would ena-
ble Congress to prohibit the purchase and home production of all meat, fish, 
                                                          
 150.  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Unlike [the Chief Justice], however, I would hold, alternatively, that the Commerce Clause au-
thorizes Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision.”). 
 151.  Id. at 2609–42. 
 152.  See id. at 2622 (“It is not hard to show the difficulty courts (and Congress) would en-
counter in distinguishing statutes that regulate ‘activity’ from those that regulate ‘inactivity.’”).  
On this point, Justice Ginsburg cites Wickard v. Filburn as a prime example, and asks the follow-
ing question: “Did the statute there at issue [in Wickard] target activity (the growing of too much 
wheat) or inactivity (the farmer’s failure to purchase wheat in the marketplace)?”  Id. at 2622–23.  
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg rejects the Chief Justice’s analogy between the health care and car 
markets on the principal basis that at some point, all individuals will be active in the health care 
market—that is, “[t]he inevitable yet unpredictable need for medical care and the guarantee that 
emergency care will be provided when required are conditions nonexistent in other markets.”  Id. 
at 2619.  Thus, at its core, the economic construction of the health care market is unique as com-
pared to other markets—for example, as Justice Ginsburg notes, just because “an individual might 
buy a car or a crown of broccoli one day, there is no certainty she will ever do so.”  Id. at 2619–
20. 
 153.  Id. at 2624. 
 154.  See id. at 2619 (“[I]t is Congress’ role, not the Court’s, to delineate the boundaries of the 
market the Legislature seeks to regulate.”).  Justice Ginsburg further noted that, despite Con-
gress’s power to define the boundaries of legislative action, “[o]ther provisions of the Constitution 
also check congressional overreaching. . . .  Supplementing these legal restraints is a formidable 
check on congressional power: the democratic process.”  Id. at 2624. 
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and dairy goods, effectively compelling Americans to eat only vegeta-
bles.”155 
Again, in light of how both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg 
interpret Commerce Clause jurisprudence, we may gain a better picture of 
whether the inaction-action dichotomy and the economic liberty interest as-
sociated with this dichotomy will revolutionize Court decisionmaking under 
the Commerce Clause and whether Congress will be able to confront future 
economic and social problems without interference from the Supreme 
Court. 
We also witness, when analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s critique of the  
majority opinion, that the formalist-realist divide is absent.  Conservative 
and liberal Justices alike reject this divide, and otherwise engage in a bidi-
rectional Supreme Court decisionmaking process that incorporates the out-
side economic, social, and political world. 
In Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, there are four primary levels of analysis, 
with each level speaking directly to the arguments in the majority opin-
ion.156  All four levels discuss why the ACA and individual mandate are 
constitutional under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, as 
well as under principles of federalism and separation of powers (congres-
sional and court power) as these principles have been applied in connection 
to the Commerce Clause.  More specifically, each of these four levels ex-
plains why precedent cannot sustain the inaction-action dichotomy and the 
liberty interest Chief Justice Roberts believes should cement this dichoto-
my. 
Level I is a discussion of the Commerce Clause in light of what the 
Framers envisioned in the Constitution, having lived under the Articles of 
Confederation, and how the Commerce Clause should be interpreted in 
Sebelius in light of this discussion.157  Level II directly addresses whether 
the inaction-action dichotomy, as justification for the unconstitutionality of 
the individual mandate and the ACA, can be sustained through an applica-
tion of the above principles and the analysis of case law.158  Level III speaks 
to Chief Justice Roberts’s fear that allowing the individual mandate to pass 
under the Commerce Clause will lead to a slippery slope of significant 
abuses by Congress, a problem that the Chief Justice believes can only be 
stopped by the introduction of a discrete, economic liberty interest.159  Lev-
                                                          
 155.  Id. at 2625. 
 156.  See infra Parts V.B.1–B.4. 
 157.  See infra Parts V.B.1.a–b. 
 158.  See infra Part V.B.2. 
 159.  See infra Parts V.B.3.a–d. 
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el IV refers back to first principles explored under Level I of the opinion, 
with particular regard to the creation of the liberty interest in light of Loch-
ner era Commerce Clause cases and principles that have been rejected by 
the Court for over seventy years.160 
1.  Level I 
a.  Interpreting the Commerce Clause in Terms of First 
Principles 
Justice Ginsburg begins her analysis of first principles by emphasizing 
that the need for a new Constitution incorporating a Commerce Clause em-
bodied the Framers’ response to the central problem of the new nation un-
der the Articles of Confederation.  She writes: 
 The Commerce Clause, it is widely acknowledged, “was the 
Framers’ response to the central problem that gave rise to the 
Constitution itself.”  Under the Articles of Confederation, the 
Constitution’s precursor, the regulation of commerce was left to 
the States.  This scheme proved unworkable, because the individ-
ual States, understandably focused on their own economic inter-
ests, often failed to take actions critical to the success of the Na-
tion as a whole.161 
Justice Ginsburg continues, “[w]hat was needed was a ‘national Gov-
ernment . . . armed with a positive & compleat authority in all cases where 
uniform measures are necessary’” on matters of general and national con-
cern.162  Furthermore, she states, “[t]he Framers’ solution was the Com-
merce Clause, which, as they perceived it, granted Congress the authority 
to enact economic legislation ‘ in all Cases for the general Interests of 
the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately in-
competent.’”163 
Indeed, the national government was charged with the power of meet-
ing the general needs of the nation, although these needs would change in 
ways the Framers did not have the wherewithal to anticipate.  Therefore, the 
Constitution, in effect, served as a preliminary blueprint.  To this effect, 
Justice Ginsburg states: 
                                                          
 160.  See infra Parts V.B.4.a–b. 
 161.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct 2566, 2615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244, 245, n.1 (1983) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)). 
 162.  Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787) in PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 368, 370 (R. Rutland ed. 1975)). 
 163.  Id. (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32  (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. 1966)). 
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 The Framers understood that the “general Interests of the Un-
ion” would change over time, in ways they could not anticipate.  
Accordingly, they recognized that the Constitution was of neces-
sity a “great outlin[e],” not a detailed blueprint, and that its provi-
sions included broad concepts, to be “explained by the context or 
by the facts of the case.”164 
Moreover, “There ought to be a [capacity] to provide for future 
contingencies[,] as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their 
nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.”165 
In this discussion of first principles, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the 
importance of the nation’s ability to meet its problems, and the responsibil-
ity of the Supreme Court to allow the nation to do so.  To meet this respon-
sibility, however, the Court must defer to Congress to understand the con-
texts and facts of specific policies—that is, to understand the “practical 
considerations” and “actual experience” of individuals in the health care 
market.166  Quoting North American Co. v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission,167 Justice Ginsburg notes that “‘[c]ommerce itself is an intensely 
practical matter.  To deal with it effectively, Congress must be able to act 
in terms of economic and financial realities.’”168 
Government powers under the Commerce Clause had been viewed as 
capacious until the Sebelius case.  To this end, Justice Ginsburg suggests 
the following: 
 Until today, this Court’s pragmatic approach to judging whether 
Congress validly exercised its commerce power was guided by 
two familiar principles.  First, Congress has the power to regulate 
economic activities “that substantially affect interstate com-
merce.”  This capacious power extends even to local activities 
that, viewed in the aggregate, have a substantial impact on inter-
state commerce.169 
b.  The Constitutionality of the ACA and the Mandate Under a 
Rational Basis Test 
Justice Ginsburg demonstrates far more deference to congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause than Justices Roberts, Scalia, and 
                                                          
 164.  Id. at 2615 (internal citations omitted). 
 165.  Id. at 2616 (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at 205–06 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (John Harvard Library ed., 2009)). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  327 U.S. 686 (1946). 
 168.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (quoting North Am. Co., 327 U.S. at 705). 
 169.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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Thomas.  Consistent with the Framers’ intent that the Commerce Clause 
help solve the problem of self-serving economic interests on the part of the 
individual states in the regulation of commerce,170 Justice Ginsburg ex-
plains that the Supreme Court should show wide deference to Congress 
when it makes economic and social laws.171  Therefore, such laws should be 
interpreted under minimal Court scrutiny using a rational basis test.172  
Thus, the Court should only declare a law unconstitutional if there is no 
connection between the law and interstate commerce.  Relying upon prior 
Supreme Court precedent, Justice Ginsburg quotes the following from Ho-
del v. Indiana173 in support of her view that the Court should give deferen-
tial treatment to congressional action: “‘This [C]ourt will certainly not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of Congress unless the relation of the subject to 
interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent.’”174 
When Justice Ginsburg applies the rational basis test to the “minimum 
coverage provision”—that is, the individual mandate of the ACA—she per-
ceives it as undoubtedly constitutional, particularly in light of the national 
scope of the health care market and the inability of individual states to suc-
cessfully regulate it.175  To further elaborate, Justice Ginsburg states the fol-
lowing: 
 Straightforward application of these principles would require 
the Court to hold that the minimum coverage provision is proper 
Commerce Clause legislation.  Beyond dispute, Congress had a 
rational basis for concluding that the uninsured, as a class, sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.  Those without insurance 
consume billions of dollars of health-care products and services 
each year.  Those goods are produced, sold, and delivered largely 
by national and regional companies who routinely transact busi-
ness across state lines.  The uninsured also cross state lines to re-
ceive care.  Some have medical emergencies while away from 
home.  Others, when sick, go to a neighboring State that provides 
better care for those who have not prepaid for care.176 
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Moreover, an individual’s decision to forgo health insurance has a sig-
nificant economic impact both on the insured and on the health care system 
overall, including on pricing—an area that Congress traditionally has had 
the power to regulate.  As Justice Ginsburg writes: 
 Not only do those without insurance consume a large amount of 
health care each year; critically, as earlier explained, their inabil-
ity to pay for a significant portion of that consumption drives up 
market prices, foists costs on other consumers, and reduces mar-
ket efficiency and stability.  Given these far-reaching effects on 
interstate commerce, the decision to forgo insurance is hardly in-
consequential or equivalent to “doing nothing”; it is, instead, an 
economic decision Congress has the authority to address under 
the Commerce Clause.177 
Finally, under rational basis scrutiny, Justice Ginsburg concluded that 
there was no doubt a reasonable connection existed between Congress’s de-
cision to require the individual mandate and its corresponding power over 
interstate commerce.  As Justice Ginsburg writes: 
 The minimum coverage provision, furthermore, bears a “rea-
sonable connection” to Congress’ goal of protecting the health-
care market from the disruption caused by individuals who fail to 
obtain insurance.  By requiring those who do not carry insurance 
to pay a toll, the minimum coverage provision gives individuals a 
strong incentive to insure.  This incentive, Congress had good 
reason to believe, would reduce the number of uninsured and, 
correspondingly, mitigate the adverse impact the uninsured have 
on the national health-care market.178 
By taking particular care to explain how the uninsured are also active 
in the health care market, consuming a large portion of it each year as de-
scribed above, we witness Justice Ginsburg’s opening salvo as to why she 
perceives that the decision not to purchase insurance is not inaction, but ra-
ther action, thus supporting the constitutionality of the individual mandate.  
As we shall explore more deeply below, Justice Ginsburg suggests that 
Congress also acted reasonably in requiring that both healthy, as well as 
sick, individuals either purchase health insurance or pay the penalty.  She 
writes: 
 Congress also acted reasonably in requiring uninsured individu-
als, whether sick or healthy, either to obtain insurance or to pay 
the specified penalty.  As earlier observed, because every person 
is at risk of needing care at any moment, all those who lack insur-
ance, regardless of their current health status, adversely affect the 
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price of health care and health insurance.  Moreover, an insur-
ance-purchase requirement limited to those in need of immediate 
care simply could not work.179 
As emphasis, Justice Ginsburg continues: “‘No insurance regime can sur-
vive if people can opt out when the risk insured against is only a risk, but 
opt in when the risk materializes.’”180 
Most importantly, concerns about the Court being practical and prag-
matic when deciding Commerce Clause cases requires that the Court’s eco-
nomic constructions respect the principles enunciated in the Court’s Level I 
analysis of the issues in Sebelius.  However, the Chief Justice’s inaction-
action dichotomy and call for a liberty interest under the Commerce Clause 
fail to do so. 
2.  Level II: The Inaction-Action Dichotomy 
As discussed in greater detail below, the following principles are at the 
core of Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s dis-
sent: (1) differences between the conservative and liberal Justices over what 
constitutes inaction and action; (2) whether the individual mandate is un-
constitutional because it forces an “inactive” uninsured person to become 
“active” in interstate commerce; and (3) whether Congress or the Court has 
the power to define inactivity and activity.  Indeed, Justice Ginsburg focus-
es directly on why the inaction-action distinction cannot be supported by 
Commerce Clause precedents, and, thus, why it is a “newly minted” con-
ception under the Commerce Clause built on Commerce Clause principles 
and economic constructions that the Supreme Court has rejected in the past 
seventy years.181  Justice Ginsburg begins her discussion of the inaction-
action dichotomy with the following: 
 Rather than evaluating the constitutionality of the minimum 
coverage provision in the manner established by our precedents, 
[the Chief Justice] relies on a newly minted constitutional doc-
trine.  The commerce power does not, [the Chief Justice] an-
nounces, permit Congress to “compe[l] individuals to become ac-
tive in commerce by purchasing a product.”182 
Justice Ginsburg’s critique of this doctrine is very detailed and fili-
greed.  Initially, Justice Ginsburg argues that even if one were to assume 
that the inaction-action distinction could fall under the umbrella of general 
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Commerce Clause principles, the distinction would still be inapplicable 
here for the following reason: “Everyone will, at some point, consume 
health-care products and services.  Thus, if [the Chief Justice] is correct 
that an insurance-purchase requirement can be applied only to those who 
‘actively’ consume health care, the minimum coverage provision fits the 
bill.”183  Simply put, it is improper to say that the individual mandate com-
pels individuals to purchase an unwanted product because all individuals 
will at some point consume health care.  Further, regardless of whether or 
not these same individuals purchase health insurance, interstate commerce 
will be directly affected both currently and prospectively in the future.184  
Justice Ginsburg speaks directly to the inactivity-activity distinction by ar-
guing that it is similar to past formulations of direct and indirect effects on 
commerce as a basis through which the Court is to decide whether an ac-
tivity affects commerce.185  Justice Ginsburg explains that the distinction 
Chief Justice Roberts formulates is built on this same direct-indirect test 
that the Court has rejected for the large part of seventy years.186  Moreover, 
even if the indirect-direct dichotomy were valid, the decision not to pur-
chase health insurance directly affects interstate commerce. As Justice 
Ginsburg states: 
 T[he Chief Justice] does not dispute that all U.S. residents par-
ticipate in the market for health services over the course of their 
lives.  But, [the Chief Justice] insists, the uninsured cannot be 
considered active in the market for health care, because “[t]he 
proximity and degree of connection between the [uninsured to-
day] and [their] subsequent commercial activity is too lacking.”187 
Contrary to the Chief Justice’s assertions, the uninsured do have a 
proximate and significant effect on the health care market for many reasons.  
Most of the uninsured in the current health care market will need health 
care, and many will need health care soon after they choose not to purchase 
health insurance.188  Moreover, Justice Ginsburg notes that the individual 
mandate is a rational congressional response to the problem of a large, un-
insured population because, as a practical matter, it is very difficult to sepa-
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rate out who among the uninsured will need medical care and who cannot 
pay for insurance.  As she states: 
 Equally evident, Congress has no way of separating those unin-
sured individuals who will need emergency medical care today 
(surely their consumption of medical care is sufficiently immi-
nent) from those who will not need medical services for years to 
come.  No one knows when an emergency will occur, yet emer-
gencies involving the uninsured arise daily.189 
Most importantly, as Justice Ginsburg further suggests, Congress has 
broad authority under the Commerce Clause, through its power to define 
the contours of the market, to cast its net widely to prevent an evil that 
Congress anticipated would come at an undetermined point in time.  As she 
explains: “To capture individuals who unexpectedly will obtain medical 
care in the very near future, then, Congress needed to include individuals 
who will not go to a doctor anytime soon.  Congress, our decisions in-
struct, has authority to cast its net that wide. ” 190  Justice Ginsburg further 
emphasizes her point, noting that “‘when it is necessary in order to prevent 
an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be pre-
vented it may do so.’”191 
In an important footnote to the above quotation, Justice Ginsburg criti-
cizes the notion that the individual mandate impermissibly regulates young 
people who have no intention of purchasing medical care and are allegedly 
too far removed from the health care market, thereby having no direct effect 
on the health care market.192  Indeed, it is this idea that is at the very core of 
the inaction-action distinction as a modern day direct-indirect effects test.  
To address this issue, she writes: 
 Echoing [the Chief Justice], the joint dissenters urge that the 
minimum coverage provision impermissibly regulates young 
people who “have no intention of purchasing [medical care]” and 
are too far “removed from the [health-care] market.”  This criti-
cism ignores the reality that a healthy young person may be a day 
away from needing health care.  A victim of an accident or un-
foreseen illness will consume extensive medical care immediate-
ly, though scarcely expecting to do so.193 
Justice Ginsburg also addresses one important polity principle: the 
power of Congress, as compared to the Supreme Court, to define markets 
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under the Commerce Clause as well as the time frames under which Con-
gress considers the actions of these individuals, businesses, and groups to 
be affecting the flow of interstate commerce. As she writes: 
[I]t is Congress’ role, not the Court’s, to delineate the boundaries 
of the market the Legislature seeks to regulate.  T[he Chief Jus-
tice] defines the health-care market as including only those trans-
actions that will occur either in the next instant or within some 
(unspecified) proximity to the next instant.  But Congress could 
reasonably have viewed the market from a long-term perspective, 
encompassing all transactions virtually certain to occur over the 
next decade, not just those occurring here and now.194 
To be sure, Congress has the power to make laws today that regulate 
individuals because of what Congress predicts will be the effect on com-
merce in the future.  In support of this view, Justice Ginsburg states the fol-
lowing: “[C]ontrary to [the Chief Justice]’s contention, our precedent 
does indeed support ‘[t]he proposition that Congress may dictate the con-
duct of an individual today because of prophesied future activity.’”195  
As a result, she concludes: 
 Our decisions thus acknowledge Congress’ authority, under the 
Commerce Clause, to direct the conduct of an individual today  
(the farmer in Wickard, stopped from growing excess wheat; the 
plaintiff in Raich, ordered to cease cultivating marijuana) because 
of a prophesied future transaction (the eventual sale of that wheat 
or marijuana in the interstate market).  Congress’ actions are 
even more rational in this case, where the future activity (the 
consumption of medical care) is certain to occur, the sole uncer-
tainty being the time the activity will take place.196 
For further clarification, the above argument suggests that, even if one 
accepts the principle that congressional power over commerce depends up-
on the directness of the action to be regulated—a principle at the core of the 
inaction-action dichotomy—Congress nonetheless still retains the authority 
to regulate individuals because of how their actions today will at some point 
lead to “prophesized,” albeit direct, impacts on interstate commerce in the 
future. 
Justice Ginsburg next responds to Chief Justice Roberts’s view that re-
quiring individuals to either purchase health insurance or pay the tax under 
the individual mandate will compel a person to purchase an unwanted prod-
uct.  To counter the Chief Justice’s view, Justice Ginsburg notes that, with-
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out question, everyone either needs, or will at some point need, health care 
and that “Congress is merely defining the terms on which individuals pay 
for an interstate good they consume . . . .”197  As she further suggests: 
 Nor is it accurate to say that the minimum coverage provision 
“compel[s] individuals . . . to purchase an unwanted product,” or 
“suite of products.”  If unwanted today, medical service secured 
by insurance may be desperately needed tomorrow.  Virtually 
everyone, I reiterate, consumes health care at some point in his or 
her life.  Health insurance is a means of paying for this care, noth-
ing more.  In requiring individuals to obtain insurance, Congress 
is therefore not mandating the purchase of a discrete, unwanted 
product.  Rather, Congress is merely defining the terms on which 
individuals pay for an interstate good they consume: Persons sub-
ject to the mandate must now pay for medical care in advance (in-
stead of at the point of service) and through insurance (instead of 
out of pocket).  Establishing payment terms for goods in or af-
fecting interstate commerce is quintessential economic regulation 
well within Congress’ domain.198 
Additionally, the individual mandate would not require that healthy 
individuals subsidize the unfit or the unhealthy.199  Rather, the individual 
mandate imposes an accountability requirement, particularly for the young, 
healthy uninsured—that is, the individual mandate requires that these par-
ticular individuals pay in advance for medical care for which they were 
previously assured would nonetheless be provided (for example, in the 
event of a catastrophic emergency) without regard to their ability to pay.200  
Because these young, healthy individuals will need health care at some 
point, whether it be within a day, a week, or a month—that is, at some un-
predictable point in the future—the individual mandate requires that the 
uninsured be held accountable for benefits for which the insured and other 
institutions, such as hospitals, have already been paying.201  As Justice 
Ginsburg writes: 
 T[he Chief Justice] also calls the minimum coverage provision 
an illegitimate effort to make young, healthy individuals subsi-
dize insurance premiums paid by the less hale and hardy.  This 
complaint, too, is spurious.  Under the current health-care system, 
healthy persons who lack insurance receive a benefit for which 
they do not pay: They are assured that, if they need it, emergency 
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medical care will be available, although they cannot afford it.  
Those who have insurance bear the cost of this guarantee.  By re-
quiring the healthy uninsured to obtain insurance or pay a penalty 
structured as a tax, the minimum coverage provision ends the free 
ride these individuals currently enjoy.202 
Moreover, as previously emphasized, all individuals in their lifetime 
will need health care; and, as we saw above, Congress can determine the 
time period under which a class of persons is defined under the Commerce 
Clause.  Thus, Justice Ginsburg concludes by capturing this in the simplest 
of terms: 
 In the fullness of time, moreover, today’s young and healthy 
will become society’s old and infirm.  Viewed over a lifespan, the 
costs and benefits even out: The young who pay more than their 
fair share currently will pay less than their fair share when they 
become senior citizens.  And even if, as undoubtedly will be the 
case, some individuals, over their lifespans, will pay more for 
health insurance than they receive in health services, they have 
little to complain about, for that is how insurance works.  Every 
insured person receives protection against a catastrophic loss, 
even though only a subset of the covered class will ultimately 
need that protection.203 
Additionally, as previously discussed, because interstate health insur-
ance and health care markets have been in existence long before enactment 
of the ACA and the individual mandate, both the insured and the uninsured 
cannot justifiably argue that they are now being forced into the interstate 
commerce.204  As Justice Ginsburg explains, “Requiring individuals to ob-
tain insurance unquestionably regulates the interstate health-insurance and 
health-care markets, both of them in existence well before the enactment 
of the ACA.”205  Instead, “‘[t]he stimulation of commerce is a use of the 
regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions there-
on.’”206  To Justice Ginsburg, then, “the ‘something to be regulated’ was 
surely there when Congress created the minimum coverage provision.”207 
Most importantly, Justice Ginsburg speaks directly to the inactivity-
activity distinction in Commerce Clause principles by emphasizing that in-
dividuals have no power to stay out of the market.208  Rather, Congress has 
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the power to define the activities as affecting commerce and to determine 
whether these activities are subject to government regulation.209  To explain 
this view, Justice Ginsburg states: 
 Nor does our case law toe the activity versus inactivity line.  In 
Wickard, for example, we upheld the penalty imposed on a farmer 
who grew too much wheat, even though the regulation had the ef-
fect of compelling farmers to purchase wheat in the open market.  
“[F]orcing some farmers into the market to buy what they could 
provide for themselves” was, the Court held, a valid means of 
regulating commerce. . . .  [T]his Court similarly upheld Con-
gress’ authority under the commerce power to compel an “inac-
tive” landholder to submit to an unwanted sale.210 
Continuing her attack on the inactivity-activity dichotomy and the 
view that the Commerce Clause does not regulate commercial “inactivity,” 
Justice Ginsburg takes issue with Chief Justice Roberts’s view of the Com-
merce Clause as a “technical legal conception,” as the following suggests: 
 In concluding that the Commerce Clause does not permit Con-
gress to regulate commercial “inactivity,” and therefore does not 
allow Congress to adopt the practical solution it devised for the 
health-care problem, [the Chief Justice] views the Clause as a 
“technical legal conception,” precisely what our case law tells us 
not to do.  This Court’s former endeavors to impose categorical 
limits on the commerce power have not fared well.  In several 
pre-New Deal cases, the Court attempted to cabin Congress’ 
Commerce Clause authority by distinguishing “commerce” from 
activity once conceived to be noncommercial, notably, “produc-
tion,” “mining,” and “manufacturing.”  The Court also sought to 
distinguish activities having a “direct” effect on interstate com-
merce, and for that reason, subject to federal regulation, from 
those having only an “indirect” effect, and therefore not amenable 
to federal control.211 
The Court has soundly rejected categorical limits on the commerce 
power and the direct-indirect effects tests, which arguably occupy the core 
of the inactivity–activity distinction Chief Justice Roberts proposes.212  In 
particular, according to Justice Ginsburg: 
 These line-drawing exercises were untenable, and the Court 
long ago abandoned them.  “[Q]uestions of the power of Con-
gress [under the Commerce Clause],” we held in Wickard, “are 
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not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give 
controlling force to nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indi-
rect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the ac-
tivity in question upon interstate commerce.”213 
Instead, Justice Ginsburg criticizes Chief Justice Roberts for “[f]ailing 
to learn from this history,” and “plow[ing] ahead with his formalistic dis-
tinction between those who are ‘ active in commerce[]’ and those who are 
not.”214 
As she further suggests, the inactivity-activity dichotomy also carries 
little weight because it is possible to restate most actions as corresponding 
inactions with the same effect.215  At a basic level, Justice Ginsburg reasons 
that the decision not to purchase health insurance can be formulated either 
in inaction or action terms.216  This distinction, therefore, cannot serve as a 
principled basis upon which to limit congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause.217 Further elaborating upon this point, Justice Ginsburg ex-
plains: It is not hard to show the difficulty courts (and Congress) would 
encounter in distinguishing statutes that regulate “activity” from those that 
regulate “inactivity.”  As Judge Easterbrook noted, “it is possible to re-
state most actions as corresponding inactions with the same effect.”218 
As Justice Ginsburg further explains, the most prominent example of 
the impracticality of the distinction is the construction of an individual’s de-
sire not to purchase health insurance—that is, the precise issue before the 
Supreme Court in Sebelius.219  Justice Ginsburg continues: “Take this case 
as an example.  An individual who opts not to purchase insurance from a 
private insurer can be seen as actively selecting another form of insur-
ance: self-insurance.”220  Similarly, “‘No one is inactive when deciding 
how to pay for health care, as self-insurance and private insurance are 
two forms of action for addressing the same risk.’” 221  As such, Justice 
Ginsburg states: 
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The minimum coverage provision could therefore be described as 
regulating activists in the self-insurance market.  Wickard is an-
other example.  Did the statute there at issue target activity (the 
growing of too much wheat) or inactivity (the farmer’s failure to 
purchase wheat in the marketplace)?  If anything, the Court’s 
analysis suggested the latter.222 
This quotation is significant because Justice Ginsburg ventures to ar-
gue that if the construction process makes it impossible to clarify the key 
distinction that is the basis for a major principle, then the principle itself 
must also be questioned.  The confusion surrounding this construction pro-
cess, as Justice Ginsburg explains, is the most telling evidence of the cen-
trality of the economic or social construction process in Supreme Court de-
cisionmaking and its relationship to the principles advocated in those cases, 
in addition to the staying power of those principles. 
Further, the relationship between this construction process and princi-
ples articulated by Supreme Court precedent also impacts the development 
of constitutional law—in particular, as the majority opinion suggests, when 
the proposed inaction-action dichotomy forms the basis for establishing a 
new, substantive liberty interest under the Commerce Clause. 
With respect to the new economic liberty interest underpinning Chief 
Justice Roberts’s inaction-action dichotomy, Justice Ginsburg articulates 
this, in what is perhaps the most important quotation in the opinion: 
 At bottom, [the Chief Justice]’s and the joint dissenters’ “view 
that an individual cannot be subject to Commerce Clause regula-
tion absent voluntary, affirmative acts that enter him or her into, 
or affect, the interstate market expresses a concern for individual 
liberty that [is] more redolent of Due Process Clause argu-
ments.”223 
Thus, at its core, sustaining the inactivity-activity distinction, and so-
lidifying this distinction as Chief Justice Roberts attempts to do, has the op-
erative effect of embedding a newly formulated liberty interest within the 
Commerce Clause, particularly where one had otherwise never before exist-
ed.  Furthermore, it is clear that, at the core of Justice Ginsburg’s analysis, 
one must look not only at the principles, but, more importantly, one must 
also look very closely to see whether the social or, as in this case, economic 
constructions supporting these principles can be both applied and sustained 
in the long term.  In this particular case, the inaction-action distinction, and 
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the liberty interest Chief Justice Roberts introduces to cement this distinc-
tion, cannot be sustained, not only because it does not fit with Commerce 
Clause precedent, but also because one cannot clearly and precisely con-
struct a principled distinction between inaction and action.224 
To be sure, the development of constitutional law is a process involv-
ing both the comparison of principles and the social and economic construc-
tions Justices articulate in support of these principles.  These comparisons 
require that Justices apply the principles they advocate to the lived lives of 
individuals, as described in precedent and as applied in cases before the Su-
preme Court.  In Sebelius, the decision not to purchase health insurance was 
compared with the actions by wheat farmers in Wickard,225 the marijuana 
growers in Raich,226 and the gun owner in a school zone in United States v. 
Lopez,227 all in light of Commerce Clause principles.  In light of Supreme 
Court precedent, even under Chief Justice Roberts’s articulation of such 
precedent, it becomes apparent that the inaction-action dichotomy does not 
have particularly deep legs.  Furthermore, as we explore in greater detail be-
low, it is also questionable whether this Court or future Courts will ever 
sustain the particularized economic liberty interest the Chief Justice articu-
lates in his majority opinion. 
3.  Level III 
a.  Addressing Fears of a Slippery Slope That Require a Liberty 
Right Under the Commerce Clause 
Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Alito, not only support a bright-line distinction between inaction and action 
in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause,228 but also emphasize that the 
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only way to end government abuse of Commerce Clause power is to embed 
an economic liberty right or interest within the Commerce Clause.229 
At the core of the argument in support of embedding a right or liberty 
interest within the Commerce Clause, however, is the fear of a slippery 
slope leading to wide abuse of governmental power if such a right is not es-
tablished.230  Justice Ginsburg pointedly addresses and admittedly pokes 
fun at this fear of a slippery slope when she suggests the following: “T[he 
Chief Justice] accepts just such specious logic when he cites the broccoli 
horrible as a reason to deny Congress the power to pass the individual 
mandate.”231  Justice Ginsburg also spends a large portion of her opinion 
specifically addressing Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, and 
their unfounded fears of a slippery slope.232  She states: “Underlying [the 
Chief Justice]’s view that the Commerce Clause must be confined to the 
regulation of active participants in a commercial market is a fear that 
the commerce power would otherwise know no limits.”233  Moreover, 
Justice Ginsburg critiques the majority’s reasoning on grounds that 
“[a]llowing Congress to compel an individual not engaged in commerce to 
purchase a product would ‘permi[t] Congress to reach beyond the natural 
extent of its authority, everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, 
and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.’”234  In its place, she ex-
plains that “[t]he joint dissenters express a similar apprehension,” noting 
“[i]f the minimum coverage provision is upheld under the commerce 
power then ‘the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power, . . . 
the hideous monster whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither sex nor age, 
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nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane.’”235  According to Justice Gins-
burg, “[t]his concern is unfounded.”236 
Point-by-point, Justice Ginsburg explains why the fear of a slippery 
slope of abuses as defined by Chief Justice Roberts is not warranted and, 
thus, why defining a new economic liberty interest is similarly unwarranted.  
As Justice Ginsburg first suggests, there is simply no need for such a right 
because the Court could uphold the individual mandate without permitting 
all congressional mandates to pass muster under the Commerce Clause, par-
ticularly where the facts either suggest or clearly demonstrate congressional 
overreaching.237  She opines: 
T[he Chief Justice] could certainly uphold the individual mandate 
without giving Congress carte blanche to enact any and all pur-
chase mandates.  As several times noted, the unique attributes of 
the health-care market render everyone active in that market and 
give rise to a significant free-riding problem that does not occur 
in other markets.238 
Moreover, relying upon Lopez, Justice Ginsburg notes that the Court 
could still apply the principles from Lopez whenever Congress attempted to 
regulate “noneconomic conduct that has only an attenuated effect on inter-
state commerce [in an area] traditionally left to state law.”239  Validating the 
individual mandate under the Commerce Clause would not strip the Court 
of this continued power; indeed, as she believes, there is no need to create a 
new liberty interest that would undermine key Commerce Clause principles 
and Court deference to the federal government’s social and economic policy 
decisions.240  As Justice Ginsburg writes: 
 Nor would the commerce power be unbridled, absent [the Chief 
Justice]’s “activity” limitation.  Congress would remain unable to 
regulate noneconomic conduct that has only an attenuated effect 
on interstate commerce and is traditionally left to state law.  In 
Lopez, for example, the Court held that the Federal Government 
lacked power, under the Commerce Clause, to criminalize the 
possession of a gun in a local school zone.  Possessing a gun near 
a school, the Court reasoned, “is in no sense an economic activity 
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any 
sort of interstate commerce.”241 
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Justice Ginsburg notes that to hold otherwise would require the Court 
“‘to pile inference upon inference’” to conclude that gun possession has a 
substantial effect on commerce.242 
b.  Analyzing Self-Insurance and the Difference Between Health 
Insurance, Broccoli, and Cars 
Justice Ginsburg further demonstrates that to analyze the validity of a 
feared slippery slope, one must directly and specifically analyze the feared 
outcomes.  Accordingly, she responds to Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion 
that upholding the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause would 
lead the federal government to mandate that persons purchase broccoli or 
automobiles:243 
 An individual’s decision to self-insure, I have explained, is an 
economic act with the requisite connection to interstate com-
merce.  Other choices individuals make are unlikely to fit the 
same or similar description.  As an example of the type of regula-
tion he fears, [the Chief Justice] cites a Government mandate to 
purchase green vegetables.  One could call this concern “the 
broccoli horrible.”  Congress, [the Chief Justice] posits, might 
adopt such a mandate, reasoning that an individual’s failure to eat 
a healthy diet, like the failure to purchase health insurance, im-
poses costs on others.244 
By analyzing the chain of inferences the Court would have to accept to 
support the broccoli or car analogy as compared to the individual mandate, 
we can thus explore whether fears of a slippery slope are justified or simply 
unwarranted.  In referring to the “piling of inference upon inference,” Jus-
tice Ginsburg explores the economic constructions that would be necessary 
to make the broccoli and car hypothetical line up with an individual’s deci-
sion not to purchase health insurance: 
 Consider the chain of inferences the Court would have to accept 
to conclude that a vegetable-purchase mandate was likely to have 
a substantial effect on the health-care costs borne by lithe Ameri-
cans.  The Court would have to believe that individuals forced to 
buy vegetables would then eat them (instead of throwing or giv-
ing them away), would prepare the vegetables in a healthy way 
(steamed or raw, not deep-fried), would cut back on unhealthy 
foods, and would not allow other factors (such as lack of exercise 
or little sleep) to trump the improved diet.  Such “pil[ing of] in-
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ference upon inference” is just what the Court refused to do in 
Lopez and Morrison.245 
Justice Ginsburg also speaks to proximity differences when addressing 
both the mandate in health care and another mandate involving the purchase 
of broccoli.  She writes: 
The failure to purchase vegetables in [the Chief Justice]’s hypo-
thetical, then, is not what leads to higher health-care costs for 
others; rather, it is the failure of individuals to maintain a healthy 
diet, and the resulting obesity, that creates the cost-shifting prob-
lem.  Requiring individuals to purchase vegetables is thus several 
steps removed from solving the problem.  The failure to obtain 
health insurance, by contrast, is the immediate cause of the cost-
shifting Congress sought to address through the ACA. Requiring 
individuals to obtain insurance attacks the source of the problem 
directly, in a single step.246 
Thus, slippery slope arguments carry little credibility if the chain of in-
ferences upon which they are built is not believable when comparisons are 
made between the government regulation sought by Congress in a particular 
case and other possible surmised regulations (in this case, the broccoli ex-
ample).  Nevertheless, it remains true that the decision whether to self-
insure has an impact on interstate commerce.  One does not have to build 
inference upon inference to see this relationship, and it is a relationship that 
falls squarely within Congress’s Commerce power.  This is not so, howev-
er, with regard to a government mandate to purchase broccoli or a car. 
c.  Individual Rights Built on Slippery Slopes with Unspecified 
or Questionable Inferences Are Unlikely to Stand 
When the definition of a newly established right is founded upon a 
slippery slope that is similarly built upon unlikely inferences, then ac-
ceptance of that right is undoubtedly questionable as precedent in future 
cases.  By analyzing landmark cases that the Supreme Court has overturned, 
one can see that when inferences are no longer applicable in terms of the 
lived lives of citizens, then a right once defined or a government action 
once permitted will likely be questioned and overturned.  For example, 
when the social construction in Plessy v. Ferguson247—namely the assertion 
that “the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely 
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because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it”248—
proved to no longer be valid because education’s role in society had 
changed, it was subsequently repudiated by Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.249 
To be sure, slippery slope arguments decontextualize case analysis in 
many ways.  In particular, slippery slopes fail to consider the polity and 
rights principles involved in different hypotheticals and their relationship to 
the possibility of the horribles built into these arguments.250  In addition, 
slippery slope arguments tend to be quite general, rather than nuanced, in 
nature.251  Despite their admitted shortcomings, slippery slopes have none-
theless played a significant role in the development of American constitu-
tional law,252 specifically with regard to whether a new right should be de-
fined, or whether prior principles should be applied in any given case before 
the Court.  For example, slippery slopes have been important in the Su-
preme Court’s failure to view factual situations and contexts as signaling a 
denial of possible constitutional rights.  Indeed, in McCleskey v. Kemp,253 
even though an African-American was more than twenty-two times as like-
ly to receive the death penalty in Georgia if he killed a white person rather 
than if he killed a black person,254 the Court emphasized that the entire 
criminal justice system would be undermined, including prosecutorial dis-
cretion, if the Court effectively acknowledged this fact.255  Further, we also 
see a slippery slope argument in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez256 where the Court feared that recognizing gross differences in 
school funding among districts would force the Court, and lower federal 
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courts, to constantly monitor state funding schemes under equal protection 
principles.257  Therefore, not only have slippery slope arguments been used 
as a basis for the inclusion of a right (as in Sebelius), but they have also 
been used to deny the expansion of group and individual rights (as in San 
Antonio Independent School District). 
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, slippery slopes also fail to 
contextualize with regard to how specific rights in the Constitution, that is, 
“legal constraints,” can keep feared slippery slopes from occurring.  As Jus-
tice Ginsburg writes: 
 Supplementing these legal restraints is a formidable check on 
congressional power: the democratic process.  As the controversy 
surrounding the passage of the Affordable Care Act attests, pur-
chase mandates are likely to engender political resistance.  This 
prospect is borne out by the behavior of state legislators.  Despite 
their possession of unquestioned authority to impose mandates, 
state governments have rarely done so.258 
d.  Attacking Broccoli, Breathing, and Specious Court Logic 
In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg launches a direct attack on the slip-
pery slope argument supported by Chief Justice Roberts, emphasizing that 
the Chief Justice engages in a “specious logic” of fear, especially by even 
contemplating that Congress would ever attempt to enforce a “vegetarian 
state” by mandating the purchase of broccoli in the future.259  To this end, 
Justice Ginsburg writes: 
When contemplated in its extreme, almost any power looks dan-
gerous.  The commerce power, hypothetically, would enable 
Congress to prohibit the purchase and home production of all 
meat, fish, and dairy goods, effectively compelling Americans to 
eat only vegetables.  Yet no one would offer the “hypothetical 
and unreal possibilit[y],” of a vegetarian state as a credible reason 
to deny Congress the authority ever to ban the possession and sale 
of goods.260 
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In addressing the joint opinions of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Alito, however, Justice Ginsburg characterizes their claims as out-
landish because they fallaciously claim that “if the minimum coverage 
provision is sustained, then Congress could make ‘breathing in and out the 
basis for federal prescription.’”261 
4.  Level IV 
a.  Back to First Principles and the Creation of a Liberty 
Interest 
Justice Ginsburg concludes her analysis of the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate under the Commerce Clause by reintroducing the theme 
of how the Constitution in general, and the Commerce Clause in particular, 
should be interpreted if they are to meet the needs of a changing society.262  
She considers whether the ACA should be declared unconstitutional merely 
as a result of its novelty, especially since the structure of providing health 
care has traditionally been focused on the role of private insurance compa-
nies.263  Novelty, however, is at times required because Congress must 
adapt to the changing economic and financial realities of today’s world.  In-
deed, principles and their attendant economic constructions under the 
Commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses permit the federal gov-
ernment to squarely face changing social and economic conditions and exe-
cute public policy in response to such conditions. As Justice Ginsburg sug-
gests: 
For decades, the Court has declined to override legislation be-
cause of its novelty, and for good reason.  As our national econ-
omy grows and changes, we have recognized, Congress must 
adapt to the changing “economic and financial realities.”  Hinder-
ing Congress’ ability to do so is shortsighted; if history is any 
guide, today’s constriction of the Commerce Clause will not en-
dure.264 
Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg suggests, the individual mandate is 
necessary and proper to the attainment of a legitimate end under Congress’s 
commerce power;265this reasoning is analogous to Justice Scalia’s reason-
ing in Gonzales v. Raich.266  She explains: 
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The minimum coverage provision is thus an “essential par[t] of a 
larger regulation of economic activity”; without the provision, 
“the regulatory scheme [w]ould be undercut.”  Put differently, the 
minimum coverage provision, together with the guaranteed-issue 
and community-rating requirements, is “‘reasonably adapted’ to 
the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power”: 
the elimination of pricing and sales practices that take an appli-
cant’s medical history into account.267 
Further, directing individuals to purchase health insurance or pay the 
individual mandate is no more far-reaching than other implied powers that 
Congress has invoked under the Necessary and Proper Clause.268  To this 
effect, Justice Ginsburg notes: 
Nor does [the Chief Justice] pause to explain why the power to 
direct either the purchase of health insurance or, alternatively, the 
payment of a penalty collectible as a tax is more far-reaching than 
other implied powers this Court has found meet under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.  These powers include the power to enact 
criminal laws; the power to imprison, including civil imprison-
ment; and the power to create a national bank.269 
In a particularly important footnote to the above quotation, Justice 
Ginsburg emphasizes that “Congress regularly and uncontroversially re-
quires individuals who are ‘doing nothing’ to take action.”270  She elabo-
rates further and notes specific examples, including “federal requirements to 
report for jury duty; to register for selective service; to purchase firearms 
and gear in anticipation of service in the Militia; . . . and to file a tax re-
turn.”271 
b. Congressional Power: “You Will Know It When You See 
It”272 
Justice Ginsburg continues by criticizing the Chief Justice for “failing 
to explain why the individual mandate threatens our constitutional or-
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der . . . .”273  In particular, Justice Ginsburg takes issue with the fact that 
Chief Justice Roberts provides no clear guidelines for federal courts when 
deciding what is and is not a permissible derivative or implied power under 
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.274  Justice Ginsburg 
harkens back to a famous footnote in a pornography case, without specific 
attribution.275  To this end, she states the following: 
How is a judge to decide, when ruling on the constitutiona-lity of 
a federal statute, whether Congress employed an “independent 
power” or merely a “derivative” one.  Whether the power used is 
“substantive,” or just “incidental”?  The instruction [the Chief 
Justice], in effect, provides lower courts: You will know it when 
you see it.276 
Justice Ginsburg concludes her opinion by reemphasizing a major, un-
spoken theme before the Supreme Court that day: 
T[he Chief Justice]’s Commerce Clause opinion, and even more 
so the joint dissenters’ reasoning, bear a disquieting resemblance 
to those long overruled decisions [of the Lochner era in the early 
20th century]. . . . Why should [the Chief Justice] strive so might-
ily to hem in Congress’ capacity to meet the new problems aris-
ing constantly in our ever-developing modern economy?  I find 
no satisfying response to that question in his opinion.277 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Analyzing Sebelius demonstrates that the formalist-realist divide is but 
a legal fiction.  As this Article suggests, all Justices, both those in majority 
and dissenting opinions on the issue of the constitutionality of the ACA and 
the individual mandate, either consciously or subconsciously reject this di-
vide.  Each of the Justices articulate polity and rights principles either in 
support of or in opposition to the ACA and the individual mandate—these 
polity and rights principles only gain meaning through economic and social 
construction of how individuals act in the real world as members of a wider 
social and economic system.  There are simultaneously formalist and realist 
aspects of all decisions, which mutually construct each other. 
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When Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ken-
nedy, and Alito, seeks to establish a bright line distinction between inaction 
and action in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause, that bright line is 
defined by his comparison of the failure of citizens to purchase health in-
surance with the failure of farmers to purchase wheat in Wickard and the 
failure of persons to grow and use marijuana in Raich.  The rejection of that 
bright line in Sebelius requires a similar comparison, but one that results in 
quite a different conclusion as to the constitutionality of the ACA and the 
individual mandate. 
Nor can the majority and dissenting opinions in Sebelius—each ad-
dressing the constitutionality of the individual mandate—be explained by 
the unidirectional impact of historical events, politics, or economic and so-
cial facts outside the Court, or the unidirectional effect of past cases or prin-
ciples.  The majority and dissenting opinions, while reaching conflicting 
conclusions, engage in a similar mutual construction process that involves 
the analysis of polity and rights principles and the contemporary construc-
tion of these principles in light of prior Commerce Clause cases. 
To explain Sebelius and doctrinal change, one must engage in Model 2 
assumptions and methods because all of the Justices engage in a mutual 
construction process as they decide the nature of individual rights and 
whether government power has been abused.278  As in Casey, where the 
Justices addressed a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, and in Law-
rence, where the Justices addressed whether homosexuals should have the 
right to engage in non-procreative sex without being criminally sanc-
tioned,279 there are differences among Justices as to what goes into the mu-
tual construction mix in Sebelius.  Despite these differences, no Justice can 
create an individual right or define the powers of Congress under the Com-
merce Clause without engaging in some kind of mutual construction pro-
cess, one which brings the outside world into the Court.  More importantly, 
the long-term staying power of a defined right, or a power granted or not 
granted to government, will depend on whether the social and economic 
construction makes sense in a changing world. 
As we have explored throughout this Article, Justice Ginsburg devotes 
a large portion of her opinion to addressing Chief Justice Roberts’s articula-
tion of the inaction-action dichotomy and its relationship to the question of 
whether a right or liberty interest for individuals under the Commerce 
Clause even exists.  She also questions whether the slippery slope of future 
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government abuse is valid if the mandate is allowed under the Commerce 
Clause and no individual right to liberty is established.  She finds, however, 
that there is no need for such a liberty interest and that having one will hurt 
the nation’s ability to meet future problems, many of which cannot now be 
defined. 
Nevertheless, in light of the increasingly complex economic and social 
systems that constitute our nation, and compounded with the problems 
Ginsburg identifies with respect to the nascent individual right proposed in 
Sebelius, it is increasingly unlikely that the nascent individual right to liber-
ty articulated by five Justices in Sebelius will ever be expanded by future 
courts.280  Moreover, expansion of this right is unlikely because the Court 
will likely continue to engage in a bidirectional mutual construction pro-
cess.281 
What is so intriguing, however, about studying the nascent individual 
right that is proposed in Sebelius and the inaction-action dichotomy upon 
which that right is built, is that if the future courts build upon the right, the 
ability of Congress and future Presidents to meet future social and econom-
ic problems will be severely limited. 
In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts seeks to place a cocoon around citi-
zens by making choices that are economic in nature that would mirror, or be 
similar to, the cocoon that surrounds citizens that prevents government from 
regulating their personal choice to engage in consensual, private, sexual ac-
tivities.282  A comparison of the rights articulated under the inaction-action 
dichotomy with rights that seek to enhance both equality and social and po-
litical inclusivity—for example, the rights articulated in Lawrence, Romer, 
and Windsor—suggests why the likelihood of rights expansion under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is higher than under the Com-
merce Clause.283  Individual rights under due process and equal protection, 
and the social constructions in support of those rights, are personal in a way 
that the right not to purchase health insurance simply is not.  Indeed, elimi-
nating privacy rights would allow government to abuse individuals and mi-
nority groups in ways that giving government permission to impact their 
economic decisions would not. 
Therefore, even though the Justices who viewed the individual man-
date and the ACA as constitutional under Congress’s Commerce Clause 
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powers lost this battle, they will ultimately win the war.  The inaction-
action dichotomy and the liberty interest Chief Justice Roberts tactfully at-
tempted to embed within the Commerce Clause will not pass the test of 
time because the economic and social constructions upon which both the 
dichotomy and the liberty interest rest will fail to survive. 
 
